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NOTE
KENTUCKY NO-FAULT: AN ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the Kentucky legislature considered seven no-
fault insurance proposals.' By the start of the 1974 session, the
field of proposals had been narrowed to three, 2 each very con-
troversial. Finally, with only one day remaining in the session,
the General Assembly appointed still another conference com-
mittee. The present no-fault legislation3 is the result of those
efforts and was frantically passed on the evening of the last day
of the 1974 session. At the time of passage the legislators had
access to only a modified copy of the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Accident Reparations Act4 [hereinafter cited as UMVARA]
with revisions typed between the lines,5 because a final copy of
the proposed act was not yet available. State Senator Michael
Moloney is reported to have said "legislators did not generally
understand what they were voting for. . . .and the legislature
should not have passed the bill."6 It comes as no surprise, that
few Kentuckians, citizens as well as practitioners, understand
what was finally enacted.
While the General Assembly relied chiefly upon the UM-
VARA, it made significant departures from the Uniform Act to
satisfy several special interest groups and to cope with a poten-
tial constitutional roadblock. These changes were implemented
by special drafting and by borrowing selected provisions from
Florida's No-Fault Act.7 As a result of this aberation, Ken-
, Cummings, Kentucky Goes No-Fault, THE REVIEW 9, (Summer, 1975).
2 Id.
3 Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 304.39-010 et seq. (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS]
(originally enacted as H.B. 314, effective July 1, 1975).
4 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT REPARATION ACT (Official Draft with Prefatory Note and
Comments, 1972) [hereinafter cited as UMVARA]. See also O'CONNELL & HENDER-
SON, TORT LAW, No-FAuLT AND BEYOND, Appendix 1 (1975) for a copy of the UMVARA.
5 Cummings, supra note 1,at 10.
6Id.
I FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.730 et seq. (1971). See also Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d
770, 774 (Ky. 1975).
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tucky's Act, which covers only personal injury and not property
damages, has never been tested as a whole. Practitioners are
wholly without precedent; the inherent problems of implemen-
tation, therefore, must be approached on a case by case basis.
This Note is an attempt to analyze and interpret the Ken-
tucky No-Fault Act with special emphasis on its unique areas.
Due to the overwhelming absence of judicial interpretation,
however, it is not inconceivable that courts as well as other
interpreters may arrive at different conclusions in particular
situations.
A. No-Fault Generally
Despite the bar's widespread criticism' articulately ex-
pounding the legal and moral dangers of the no-fault concept,
no-fault insurance is here to stay. Presently, 24 states in addi-
tion to Puerto Rico have enacted no-fault legislation,9 with
between 50' 0 and 76 percent" of this country's population sub-
ject to the various plans. No two plans, however, are identical
and attempts to enact a federal plan have been repeatedly
8 AMERICAN TRIAL LAwYERS Assoc., NO-FAULT INSURANCE - A PRIMER (1972). See
also David, A Summary Appraisal of "No-Fault" Today, 38 Ky. BAR J. 35 (1974).
' XXI THE CoUNciL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 365 (1976-
77). In alphabetical order the states are: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-4014 et seq.
(Supp. 1975); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-701 et seq. (1974); Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 38-319 et seq. (1975); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 2118
(1973); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.730 et. seq. (1971); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §
34016 et seq. (Supp. 1976); Hawaii, HAwAII REv. STAT. § 294-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Kentucky, KRS § 304.39-010
et seq. (Supp. 1976); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 538 et seq. (Supp. 1972);
Massachusetts, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 34A et seq. (1973); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAwS ANN. § 500.3101 et seq. (Supp. 1973); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.41 et
seq. (Supp. 1975); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. § 698.010 et seq. (1973); New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1 et seq. (1972); New York, N.Y. INs. LAw § 670 et seq. (McKinney
Supp. 1975-76); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-01 et seq. (Supp. 1975);
Oregon, ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.786 et seq. (1972); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40
§ 1009.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.101 et seq.
(Supp. 1974); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAwS ANN. § 58-23-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970);
Texas, TEx. REv. INs. CODE art. 5.06-3 (Pamphlet Supp. 1973); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 31-41-1 et seq. (1973); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380.1 (1972).
11 XXI THE CoUNcIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTs, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 365 (1976-
77).
" Auto Reform in No-Fault Moves Ahead - 76% of U.S. Population Covered, 9
TRIAL 5 (1973).
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defeated.2 As a result, the United States is a "crazy-quilt" of
no-fault legislation."3 With this in mind it is appropriate to
review the basic no-fault concept and the principal forms taken
in its legislative implementation.
While the principal purposes of no-fault legislation are still
disputed, the dispute is not whether one purpose excludes an-
other, but rather which purpose should take precedence."
Some say that "[t]he fundamental basis for a no-fault system
is the abolishment of tort liability in automobile accidents,
with* each driver or owner accepting responsibility for some or
all losses sustained by pedestrians and by occupants of his own
vehicle in return for which he would enjoy immunity from lia-
bility for those losses."' 5 Another position is advocated through
the "Delaware" plan where no-fault benefits are paid but tort
liability is not abolished.'6 The common thread in all the plans,
however, is the desire to provide a method of compensating
automobile accident victims without regard to fault. The main
distinction among the plans, therefore, is the extent to which
this method of compensation eliminates the traditional tort
system.
B. Three Basic No-Fault Concepts
Existing plans run the gamut from complete or partial
elimination of traditional or fault remedies, "true" plans, to
plans of first party benefits in addition to traditional remedies
in tort, "modified" no-fault plans. While plans are generally
termed either "true" or "modified,' 7 a more concise classifica-
tion has been developed by F. Lawrence Matthews,'" who div-
ides the plans into the "Massachusetts," "Delaware" and
"South Dakota" type plans.
12 Kozyris, No-Fault Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-An Interim Update,
1973 DuKE L.J. 1009, 1010 at n.2.
13 Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-Cutting the
Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DuKE L.J. 331, 334.
" At least one commentator feels that no-fault is not the only answer. Eldred, Is
No-Fault the Only Answer for the Uncompensated Motorist? 1974 INs. Coy. J. 185. See
also Ring, The Fault with No-Fault, 49 NOTRE DAmr LAwYER 796 (1974).
, W. ROKES, No-FAULT INsuRANcE 3 (1971).
" DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a) (Supp. 1975).
, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Jan. 5, 1976, at 37.
F. MATmrEws, BLASHFELD AuTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 275.4 (3rd ed. 1976
Supp.) [hereinafter cited as BLAsHsmLD].
[Vol. 65
KENTUCKY NO-FAULT
The "Massachusetts" plan, in force in 16 states,'9 is the
basic "threshold" approach which absolutely bars an injured
person's nonpecuniary tort remedies unless certain conditions
result from the accident. Suits for nonpecuniary damages may
be allowed for example, when the accident causes death or
serious personal injury or when medical expenses reach a cer-
tain threshold amount. The conditions and threshold amounts
vary from state to state.
20
Under the "Delaware" approach there is no restriction on
the injured person's recovery in tort. Delaware, Oregon, Mary-
land, Texas, and South Carolina have enacted this type of
plan, which allows for complete recovery, including damages
for pain and suffering, and provides arbitration for the settle-
ment of small claims.
21
The "South Dakota" plan is similar to the "Delaware"
approach in that no restriction is placed on the injured person's
tort remedy. Under this approach, however, no-fault coverage
" COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-706(b) (1974) $25,000 BRP limit, § 10-4-714(1)(e)
(1974) $500 tort threshold; CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 38-320(d) (1972) $5,000 BRP limit,
§ 38-323 (1972) $400 tort threshold; F.A. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(1) (1971) $5,000 BRP
limit, § 627.737 (2) $1000 tort threshold; GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3403b(b)(1) (Supp. 1974)
$2,500 BRP limit, §§ 56-3402b(j) and 56-3410b(a) (Supp. 1974) $500 tort threshold;
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 294-2(10) (Supp. 1974) $15,000 BRP, §§ 294-6(2) and 294-10(b)
(Supp. 1974) the threshold limit is determined each year by the Commissioner of
Insurance in order to exclude 90 percent of automobile tort claims. KAN. STAT. ANN. §
40-3103(k) (Supp. 1974) $2,000 BRP limit, § 40-3117 (Supp. 1974) $500 tort threshold;
KRS § 304.39-010(a) (Supp. 1976) $10,000 BRP limit, § 304.39-060(b) (Supp. 1976)
$1,000 tort threshold; MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90 § 34(A) (1973) $2,000 BRP limit, § 34(M)
(1973) $500 tort threshold; MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 500.3107 (1973) no limit on BRP
coverage, § 500.3135 (1973) no dollar threshold but there must be a serious injury;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B44(1) (Supp. 1975) $30,000 BRP limit, § 65B51(3)(a) (Supp.
1975) $2,000 tort threshold; NEv. REv. STAT. § 698.070 (1973) $10,000 BRP limit, §
698.280(1)(i) (1973) $750 tort threshold; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (1972) no limit on
BRP, § 39:6A-8 (1972) $200 threshold on soft tissue injury; N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(1),
(McKinney Supp. 1975-76) $50,000 BRP limit, § 671(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76)
$500 tort threshold; N. D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(2) (1975) $15,000 BRP limit, §§ 26-
41-03(18) and 26-41-03(12)(1)(a) (1975) $1,000 tort threshold; PA. STAT. ANN tit. 40 §§
1009.103 and 1009.202 (1974) unlimited BRP coverage, tit. 40 § 1009.301(a)(5)(B)
(1974) $750 tort threshold; UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-41-6(a) (1973) $2,000 BRP limit, §
31-41-9 (1973) $500 tort threshold. See also BLAsHFiLD §§ 275.5 -.57A; I. SCHERMER,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE, §§ 8.01 -.23 (1st ed.1975) [hereinafter cited as
SCHERMER].
2 See statutes cited in note 19 supra.
21 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21 § 2118 (1973); ORE. REv. STAT. § 743.786 et seq. (1972);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A § 538 et seq. (Supp. 1972); TEx. REv. INs. CODE art. 5.06-3
(Pamphlet Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
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is not mandatory and there is no scheme of compulsory insur-
ance. This version of no-fault is in force in South Dakota, Ar-
kansas, and Virginia.
2
Although the Kentucky no-fault plan does not exactly fit
any of these categories, it resembles the "Massachusetts" plan
to the extent that it includes the basic "threshold" approach.2
This "threshold" approach was Kentucky's most significant
departure from the UMVARA, a plan which virtually abolishes
tort liability.
24
II. KENTUCKY'S No FAULT INSURANCE Acr
A. Constitutionality of No-Fault
One major objection to the adoption of "true" no-fault
plans is their denial of access to the courts and the resulting
limit on an injured person's ability to pursue traditional reme-
dies in tort.25 This problem was compounded in Kentucky and
Pennsylvania by constitutional limitations. 26 Section 54 of the
Kentucky Constitution provides that: "The General Assembly
shall have no power to limit the amount to be recovered for
injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to person or prop-
erty."
When no-fault was originally considered in Kentucky, it
was thought that any plan would necessarily violate this consti-
tutional mandate. As one commentator concluded:
[I]t seems likely that a no-fault threshold plan would face
serious constitutional problems in Kentucky unless a consti-
tutional amendment were passed. Sections 14 and 54 of the
constitution present serious obstacles to the implementation
of a no-fault threshold plan which apparently could not be
overcome even if an attempt were made to uphold the plan
on the theory of implied consent. Before a no-fault plan is
adopted for Kentucky, all possible constitutional problems
2 S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 58-23-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970) ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-
4014 et seq. (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-380.1 (1972).
KRS § 304.39-060(5) (Supp. 1976).
, UMVARA at § 5.
2 See, e.g., 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 178, 180 (1974).
26 PA. CONsT. art. II, § 18, provides that "The General Assembly may enact
[workmen's compensation laws]. . . but in no other cases shall the General Assembly
limit the amount to be recovered . . . for injuries to persons . ... "
[Vol. 65
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should be carefully considered and serious thought should be
given to the possibility of adopting a no-fault plan without a
threshold, such as the Delaware plan, or the possibility of
first proposing a constitutional amendment and letting the
people decide for themselves which type of protection they
would prefer.Y
In response to an inquiry from the Kentucky Legislative
Research Commission, the Attorney General concluded that
"any compulsory no-fault automobile law which restricts or
abolishes the right to bring an action in tort for damages, would
be unconstitutional in Kentucky.
'28
The authors of these opinions, however, did not consider
modifications of existing plans. The commentator based her
opinion on the Keeton-O'Connell Basic Protection Plan,' 9 while
the Attorney General made his analysis based on the adoption
of the UMVARA as proposed by the ABA's National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Law °.3 In addition,
these authors did not foresee the Kentucky Supreme Court
holding a noncompulsory no-fault scheme or one based on im-
plied consent 3' constitutional.
Recognizing the obstacle created by section 54 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution, the General Assembly inserted an
"implied consent" provision into the Act. Under this provision
any person who registers, operates, maintains, or uses a motor
vehicle on Kentucky's highways does so on the condition that
such conduct constitutes an acceptance of the limitation on his
traditional rights in torts. 2 Much like the Kentucky Work-
" Comment, 62 Ky. L.J. 590, 603 (1974).
n 73 Op. Ky. ATr'y Ga. 310 (1973) [hereinafter cited as OAG].
"S Comment, supra note 27, at 591. The author noted that:
The Basic Protection Plan and its derivatives have two main features:
(1) auto accident victims are reimbursed by their own insurance company
for all out-of-pocket losses connected with bodily injury (medical bills, wage
loss, funeral bills, etc.) without regard to who was at fault; and (2) the
traditional tort recovery for pain and suffering is available only to those who
can cross a certain threshold established by the statute. The threshold may
be stated in terms of injuries within a specific category or in terms of expen-
ses above a specified level. For example, a plan that abolishes the right to
recover for pain and suffering unless the injury results in permanent disabil-
ity or unless the medical bills are at least $500 is a threshold plan.
73 OAG 310.
" Comment, supra note 27, at 603.
KRS § 304.39-060(1) (Supp. 1976).
1976]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
men's Compensation Act3" the no-fault legislation provides
that any person may affirmatively reject this limitation.
34
In Fann v. McGuffey, 3 the Kentucky Supreme Court held
in a 4 to 3 decision that the No-Fault Act did not violate section
54.36 In this case it was argued that imposing the tort restric-
tions on persons who do not affirmatively reject the restrictions
because they use, operate, or maintain a motor vehicle in the
state, took away their right of access to courts as well as their
traditional tort remedy protected by section 54 without a
"knowing, intelligent and voluntary" waiver of their constitu-
tional rights.3 The Court, however, held that the proper test
of implied consent is "whether under all the circumstances,
considering the public purpose sought to be accomplished and
the nature and extent of detriment to the individual, it is rea-
sonable for [the Court] to presume a consent where none ex-
ists in fact. ' 3 Recognizing the state's interest in making and
enforcing regulations to protect both resident and nonresident
users of the state's highways, the Court drew support from the
implied consent provisions of nonresident motorist statutes
which were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Hess v. Pawloski35
The Kentucky Court found further support for its decision
in Wells v. Jefferson County.4" In Wells the Court held that the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which provided that an em-
ployee who failed to file a written notice of rejection accepted
the Act's provisions, did not violate section 54. In addition, the
Court hinted'that they would be inclined to give judicial defer-
ence to the General Assembly."
KRS § 342.395 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 304.39-060(4) (Supp. 1976).
534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975).
31 Id. at 776.
31 Brief for Ky. Assoc. of Trial Lawyers as Amicus Curiae at 5-16, Fann v. McGuf-
fey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 776 (Ky. 1975).
3' 534 S.W.2d at 776.
31' 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
40 255 S.W.2d 462 (Ky. 1953).
" Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Ky. 1975): "The responsibility of
pronouncing life-or-death judgment on a piece of legislation so important as this can-
not be discharged by an exercise of legal virtuosity. It would be all too easy to tear it
down and look brilliant in the execution, but it is the duty of the court to save it if
possible, and not to condemn it if there is a reasonable doubt of its unconstitu-
tionality."
[Vol. 65
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It should be pointed out that the Court could have easily
declared Kentucky no-fault unconstitutional. The decision was
four to three with Chief Justice Reed providing the determining
vote. The Chief Justice was not unmindful that Wells squarely
held that sections 54 and 241 of the Kentucky Constitution
were not offended by the workmen's compensation statute.
Reed, however, felt that to be an erroneous decision, and recon-
ciled his position in his concurring opinion:
I seriously question the correctness of that decision, but I am
not prepared to declare the entire Workmen's Compensation
Law unconstitutional in view of the reliance placed on the
decision. Although I am mindful of the judicial oath to sup-
port the Constitution of this State regardless of personal
judgments concerning the wisdom of some of its provisions, I
am, nevertheless, also so influenced by the legal principles of
stability and predictability of judicial constitutional con-
structions that I am unable in this case to ignore a constitu-
tional construction made by this court and on which affected
parties, including the legislature, should be able to rely.
2
B. Purposes of the Kentucky No-Fault Act
As it is with the enactment of other new legislation, the
purposes of the Kentucky No-Fault Act are specifically enu-
merated in Kentucky Revised Statutes § 304.39-010
[hereinafter cited as KRS] . These purposes reflect a desire
42 Id. at 779 (Reed, C.J., concurring). While Farn rendered thp constitutionality
of Kentucky's threshold provision moot, there is a wealth of cases and commentary
on the subject in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Martel, No-Fault Automobile Insurance
in Pennsylvania-A Constitutional Analysis, 17 VmL. L. Rav. 783 (1972); Ruben &
Williams, The Constitutionality of Basic Protection, 1 CoNN. L. REv. 44 (1968); Note,
Equal Protection: No-Fault and the Poor, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 727 (1972); Note, No-
Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah-State Constitutional Issues, 1970 UTAH L. Rv.
248; Comment, No-Fault Automobile Insurance in New Jersey: Constitutional
Problems, 3 SsroN HALL L. REv. 386 (1972); Comment, No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insur-
ance: A Constitutional Perspective, 46 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 104 (1971).
13 KRS § 304.39-010 (Supp. i976):
Policy and Purpose. The toll of about 20,000,000 motor vehicle accidents
nationally and comparable experience in Kentucky upon the interests of
victims, the public, policyholders and others require that improvements in
the reparations provided for herein be adopted to effect the following pur-
poses:
(1) To require owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles in
the commonwealth to procure insurance covering basic reparation benefits
1976]
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for prompt and liberal recovery to accident victims without
regard to fault. While this section does not emphasize the abo-
lition of tort liability, it does express the desire to reduce litiga-
tion. This observation is important because many citizens and
practitioners overemphasize the limitation of a person's tort
remedies. As the analysis and interpretation of the Kentucky
Act progresses, it should become apparent that this orientation
toward benefits with the resulting limitation is a greater bene-
fit than detriment to the Kentucky practitioner.
The Act's purposes are implemented principally through
KRS § 304.39-030, basic reparation benefits, KRS § 304.39-060,
limitation of tort rights, and KRS § 304.39-090, required insur-
ance coverage. While the concepts "basic reparation benefits"
[hereinafter cited as BRB] and "limitation of tort rights" are
often used interchangeably,44 the concepts are different and
their applicability should be determined by different criteria.
In a particular situation, neither or only one may apply. Al-
though the combination of possible fact patterns that trigger
these different concepts are obviously too numerous to treat, it
is desirable to discuss several basic assumptions inherent in the
Kentucky Act.
and legal liability arising out of ownership, operation or use of such motor
vehicles;
(2) To provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents
without regard to whose negligence caused the accident in order to eliminate
the inequities which fault-determination has created;
(3) To encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the
motor vehicle accident victim by providing for prompt payment of needed
medical care and rehabilitation;
(4) To permit more liberal wage loss and medical benefits by allowing
claims for intangible loss only when their determination is reasonable and
appropriate;
(5) To reduce the need to resort to bargaining and litigation through
a system which can pay victims of motor vehicle accidents without the delay,
expense, aggravation, inconvenience, inequities and uncertainties of the lia-
bility system;
(6) To help guarantee the continued availability of motor vehicle in-
surance at reasonable i rices by a more efficient, economical and equitable
system of motor vehicle accident reparations;
(7) To create an insurance system which can more adequately be regu-
lated; and
(8) To correct the inadequacies of the present reparation system, rec-
ognizing that it was devised and our present Constitution adopted prior to
the development of the internal combustion motor vehicle.
" David, supra note 8, at 37.
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C. Basic Reparation Benefits
The first assumption implicit throughout the Act is that
everyone sustaining personal injuries in an automobile acci-
dent in Kentucky will be entitled to basic reparation benefits.
KRS § 304.39-030(1) is very explicit in including "every per-
son" except one who has rejected the limitation upon his tort
rights as provided in KRS § 304.39-060(4). In addition, con-
verters of motor vehicles45 and those intentionally causing in-
jury to themselves or to other persons46 are also excluded from
BRB by other provisions of the Act. On the other hand, it is
possible for a person who rejects the limitation on his tort rights
to be entitled to BRB because he purchased this as additional
coverage on his automobile insurance policy." The second as-
sumption implicit throughout the Act and explicit in KRS §
304.39-040(1) is that the injured party is entitled to BRB pay-
ments without regard to fault. A more complete analysis of
BRB necessarily includes what basic reparation benefits are,
who is entitled to receive them, who is exempted, and from
what source are benefits paid.
1. What is Paid Under BRB
KRS § 304.39-020(2) broadly defines basic reparation ben-
efits to be
benefits providing reimbursement for net loss suffered
through injury arising out of the operation, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle, subject, where applicable, to the lim-
its, deductibles, exclusions, disqualifications and other con-
ditions provided in this subtitle.
According to the Comment to section 1(5) of the UM-
VARA, the starting point in calculating BRB is the under-
standing of the concept of "loss."
KRS § 304.39-190 (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 304.39-200 (Supp. 1976).
47 KRS § 304.39-140(5) (Supp. 1976):
Reparation obligors shall make available upon request to those persons who
have rejected their tort limitations, in accordance with KRS 304.39-060(4),
basic reparation benefits coverage and added reparation benefits.
1976]
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Loss is defined in a sense which is limited to economic detri-
ment, and is further defined to include accrued loss only,
consistent with the provision on reparation obligor's duty to
respond to claims (Section 23) that "loss accrues not when
injury occurs, but as . . .loss . . . is incurred."4
Like the UMVARA, the Kentucky Act includes in BRB
coverage reasonable and necessary "medical expense,"49 but
the Kentucky Act broadens "medical expense" by definition to
include expenses incurred in the performance of healing arts0
according to recognized religious methods. The Kentucky Act
also increases the allowance for burial expenses to $1000,-1
which the UMVARA limits to $500.52
One of the troublesome aspects of the Act involves the
word "reimbursement" in the definition of BRB. While most
states require the insurer to pay the injured person even though
he has not personally paid for any services," Massachusetts
specifically requires that the injured party pay for the services
as a condition to the recovery of benefits.54 Maryland reaches
a similar result by using the word "reimbursement.15 Al-
though KRS § 304.39-020(2) also contains the word "reim-
4 UMVARA at § 1(5), Comment.
49 Id.
[U]nless intensive care is medically required, coverage for a hospital room
is limited to a "reasonable and customary charge for semi-private accommo-
dations." The limitation applies only to the cost of an ordinary hospital
room, and is inapplicable to charges for use of such hospital facilities as
surgery and recovery rooms.
KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) (Supp. 1976). "There shall be a presumption that any medical
bill submitted is reasonable." Id. Contra, Victum v. Martin, 326 N.E.2d 12 (Mass.
1975). Plaintiff's testimony, itemized bills, and supporting affidavit of doctor were
considered sufficient to infer that the medical expense was necessary.
" Ky. Dept. of Ins. Bulletin from Harold B. McGuffey to All Automobile Liability
Insurers 1 (March 4, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Bulletin].
The term "all healing arts professions licensed by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky," as used in KRS 304.39-020(5)(a), shall be interpreted to include
all practitioners of such healing arts whether actually licensed in Kentucky
or similarly licensed in some other state.
Id.
51 KRS § 304.39-020(5)(a) (Supp. 1976).
52 UMVARA at § l(a)(5)(i).
5 SCHRMER, supra note 19, at § 2.03.
" MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90 § 34A (1975). This necessity of initial payment
appears to apply only to those services which the injured party would have provided
for himself had he not been injured but which he must now purchase. Id.
11 MD. ANN. CODE art. 48a, § 539 (Supp. 1972).
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bursement," hopefully Kentucky's courts will not accept this
interpretation. The policy expressed by the Kentucky Act in
favor of prompt payment of benefits without regard to fault56
and the Act's overall orientation towards recovery indicate that
an injured person need not pay out-of-pocket expenses before
the insurer is obligated to make payment. This would discrimi-
nate between those who are able to pay in advance and those
who are not. Kentucky courts can find support for this interpre-
tation in KRS § 304.39-210(1) which allows an insurance com-
pany to make payments directly to the provider of products,
services, and accommodations, and in KRS § 304.39-240(b)
which allows assignment of benefits only for medical expense
"to the extent the benefits are for the cost of products services,
or accommodations provided or to be provided by the as-
signee."
57
In addition to medical expenses, BRB also includes "work
loss," which the Kentucky Act defines as "loss of income from
work the injured person would probably have performed if he
had not been injured . . . ."Is Because section 1(5)(ii) of the
UMVARA refers to income from the work the injured person
would have performed, there is an indication that the drafters
of the Kentucky Act, by adding the word "probably," intended
that the unemployed could also receive work loss benefits. 59
Arguably, this recovery is for loss of "earning capacity" and not
a loss of "actual earnings."
Kentucky differs in one other respect. It leaves out the
UMVARA provision which requires the insured to mitigate
damages and allows an offset for "income he would have earned
in available appropriate substitute work he was capable of per-
forming but unreasonably failed to undertake. '0
KRS § 304.39-010(2) (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 304.39-240(b) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
KRS § 304.39-020(5)(b) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
, This is contrary to the intent of UMVARA § 1(5). See, e.g., UMVARA at § 1(5),
Comment, which expresses the intent to completely foreclose BRB payment for "work
loss" to unemployed persons.
"Work loss," as are the other components of loss, is restricted to accrued loss,
and thus covers only actual loss of earnings as contrasted to loss of earning
capacity. Thus, an unemployed person suffers no work loss from injury until
the time he would have been employed but for his injury.
Id.
, UMVARA at § 1(5)(ii). The Kentucky approach statutorily adopts the collat-
eral source rule in KRS § 304.39-250 (Supp. 1976):
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This recovery, however, is not without limit. KRS §
304.39-130 restricts the amount recoverable for work loss to
$200 per calendar week, prorated for any lesser period, and
further provides that "[i]f the injured person's earnings or
work are seasonal or irregular, the weekly limit shall be equita-
bly adjusted or apportioned on an annual basis." Because BRB
payments, like workmen's compensation and Social Security
benefits, are not subject to federal income tax, the injured
person receiving payment for work loss could receive more than
his regular take-home pay. Since the Act is designed to indem-
nify the injured person and not provide a windfall, there is a
presumption that the value of the tax advantage is 15 percent
of the loss of income. This presumption, however, can be rebut-
ted by a showing that the claimant's tax advantage was less
than this amount.' In addition, work loss benefits are exempt
from garnishment, attachment, execution and any other pro-
cess or claim,6" and with some exceptions, assignments are
unenforceable."
BRB also includes "replacement services loss" which are
expenses reasonably incurred in obtaining ordinary and neces-
sary services in lieu of those the injured person would have
performed, not for income but for the benefit of himself or his
family, if he had not been injured.""
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, [KRS § 304.39-120: (1) cover-
ing benefits from workmen's compensation and social security, and (2) cover-
ing income tax savings] basic reparation benefits shall be paid without
deduction or setoff.
The Department of Insurance has issued at least two opinions stating that the common
law collateral source rule is applicable to the no-fault benefits; therefore, employee sick
leave benefits are not deductible from BRB payments. The Department based its
opinion on Davidson v. Vogler, 507 S.W.2d 160 (Ky. 1974) and 22 AM. JuR. DAMAGES §
208 (1965). Letters from Edward L. Fossett, General Counsel, Ky. Department of
Insurance to Fireman's Fund and Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., Mar. 3 and 11, 1976,
respectively. These grounds seem unnecessary if one considers the unequivocal man-
date of KRS § 304.39-250.
61 KRS § 304.39-120(2) (Supp. 1976). See also UMVARA at § 11, Comment.
6 2 KRS § 304.39-260 (Supp. 1976).
13 KRS § 304.39-240 (Supp. 1976).
11 KRS § 304.39-020(5)(c) (Supp. 1976). For example UMVARA at § 1(5), Com-
ment, states:
[A] housewife whose injury prevented her from performing services in the
home could not attribute loss to the incapacity itself, but loss would be
suffered if domestic help were hired to perform those services.
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The maximum amount of BRB payable for economic loss
for any one person as the result of one accident is $10,000.1
5
Although the UMVARA does not limit the total amount of
benefits receivable, it does restrict recovery for work loss, re-
placement services loss, survivor's economic loss, and survi-
vor's replacement services loss." Even with this limit, however,
Kentucky's Act, according to the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation, will fully compensate 99.6 percent of all accident
victims." Unlike some states which provide for a per accident
limitation similar to the traditional liability coverage of
$10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident,"8 Kentucky's
$10,000 per person limit applies to each individual regardless
of how many persons were injured in the accident. 9
"Survivor's economic loss ''7° and "survivor's replacement
services loss"7 provide the decedent's survivors 72 with benefits
£ KRS § 304.39-020(2) (Supp. 1976).
" UMVARA at § 13.
DEPT. OF TRANS. REPORT AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMs 30 (1970). This
same report estimates that 89.1 percent of all accident victims will have less than $1000
economic loss (other than property damage).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(2)(b) (Supp. 1976), which limits
BRB to $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident.
" KRS § 304.39-020(2) (Supp. 1976). Some states provide for only $5,000 BRB
coverage. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 38-320(d) (1975) and FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736 (1971).
76 KRS § 304.39-020(5)(d) (Supp. 1976).
"Survivor's economic loss" means loss after decedent's death of contribu-
tions of things of economic value to his survivors, not including services they
would have received from the decedent if he had not suffered the fatal injury,
less expenses of the survivors avoided by reason of decedent's death.
Id.
11 KRS § 304.39-020(5)(e) (Supp. 1976).
"Survivor's replacement services loss" means expenses reasonably incurred
by survivors after decedent's death in obtaining ordinary and necessary serv-
ices in lieu of those the decedent would have performed for their benefit if
he had not suffered the fatal injury, less expenses of the survivors avoided
by reason of the decedent's death and not subtracted in calculating survi-
vor's economic loss.
Id.
n KRS § 304.39-020(13) (Supp. 1976). "'Survivor' means a person identified in
KRS 411.130 as one identified to receive benefits by reason of the death of another
person." Id. KRS § 411.130 (Supp. 1976) reads:
Action for wrongful death-personal representative to prosecute-
distribution of amount recovered.
(1) Whenever the death of a person results from an injury inflicted by
the negligence or wrongful act of another, damages may be recovered for the
death from the person who caused it, or whose agent or servant caused it. If
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for the loss of compensation and services which the decedent
would have provided if he had not died. Survivor benefits are
similar to damages for wrongful death, except that "replace-
ment services loss" is limited to actual economic loss.73 Like the
majority of wrongful death statutes, the No-Fault Act's mea-
surement of damage is the survivors' loss." Expenses saved by
the survivors as a result of the decedent's death must therefore
be deducted.75
The decedent's probable life expectancy,76 had he not been
killed, and the extent to which he would have contributed eco-
nomic value to the survivors in the form of property or services
are used to calculate the survivors' benefits. Kentucky prac-
titioners should remember, however, that these benefits, al-
though analogous to basic wrongful death statutes, cannot be
the act was willful or the negligence gross, punitive damages may be re-
covered. The action shall be prosecuted by the personal representative of the
deceased.
(2) The amount recovered, less funeral expenses and the cost of admin-
istration and costs of recovery including the attorney fees, not included in
the recovery from the defendant, shall be for the benefit of and go to the
kindred of the deceased in the following order:
(a) If the deceased leaves a widow or husband and no children or their
descendants, then the whole to the widow or husband;
(b) If the deceased leaves a widow and children or a husband and
children, then one-half (1/2) to the widow or husband and the other one-half
(1/2) to the children of the deceased;
(c) If the deceased leaves a child or children, but no widow or husband,
then the whole to the child or children;
(d) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, then the recov-
ery shall pass to the mother or father of the deceased, one moiety each, if
both are living, the whole thereof shall pass to the father; and if the father
is dead and the mother living, the whole thereof shall go to the mother;
(e) If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, and if both
father and mother are dead, then the whole of the recovery shall become a
part of the personal estate of the deceased, and after the payment of his debts
the remainder, if any, shall pass to his kindred more remote than those above
named, according to the law of descent and distribution.
" KRS § 304.39-020(5)(2) (Supp. 1976).
" MCCORMICK ON DAMAGzs § 98, at 344 (1935).
7' Id.; KRS § 304.39-020(5)(d) (Supp. 1976).
7' The Life Expectancy and Annuity Table found in 1 BANKS-BALDwaN KRS AND
RuLE SERvicE is normally accepted for use in Kentucky. Although it is not part of the
official state laws, its existence was recognized in Morris v. Morris, 293 S.W.2d 243
(Ky. 1956). The current table was based on population figures from 1959-61, and does
not differentiate among men, women, and racial groups even though there is a known
difference in life expectancies among these groups.
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reconciled with Kentucky's wrongful death statute which mea-
sures recovery by the loss to the estate . 7 Recovery under Ken-
tucky's wrongful death statute is the amount which the de-
ceased would have accumulated during his lifetime "but for"
his wrongful death." One of the principal differences between
damage measurement based on the survivors' loss and the es-
tate's loss is evidenced when determining damages or benefits
for the death of a child. Under the survivors' economic loss
coverage, used with Kentucky's no-fault, the surviving parents
would be unable to prove economic loss because the cost of
rearing a child is usually greater than any contributions the
child may make to the family unit. This is significantly differ-
ent from determining what the child's estate would have been
worth had he not been killed in the accident.
The drafters of the Kentucky No-Fault Act apparently did
not consider this distinction between recovery under no-fault
and wrongful death for they defined "survivors" as those per-
sons identified in KRS § 411.130,"g which identifies those per-
sons who are to receive damages owing to the decedent's estate.
Of particular importance is subsection (e):
If the deceased leaves no widow, husband or child, and
if both father and mother are dead, then the whole of the
recovery shall become a part of the personal estate of the
deceased, and after the payment of his debts the remainder,
if any, shall pass to his kindred more remote than those above
named, according to the law of descent and distribution."
It is inconceivable that survivors' economic loss benefits would
be paid to the personal estate of the deceased; only individuals
and not the estate can suffer compensible losses. Therefore,
subsection (e) should be either totally disregarded or the legis-
lature should provide a section which designates additional
persons, who because of their relationship with the deceased,
would have likely received economic value and services from
the deceased had he survived."1
T MCCORMICK, supra note 74, at § 96.
7A KRS § 411.130 (1972).
7, KRS § 304.39-020(13) (Supp. 1976).
u Id.
" Kentucky should look at the elaborate scheme instituted by Minnesota. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 65 B.44(6) (1975) provides that:
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2. Who is Entitled to Basic Reparation Benefits
BRB are paid only for injuries arising out of maintenance
or use of a motor vehicle." This includes the use of a "motor
vehicle as a vehicle including occupying, entering into and
alighting from it," but
[i]t does not include (i) conduct within the course of a busi-
ness of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor
vehicles unless the conduct occurs off the business premises,
or (ii) conduct in the course of loading and unloading the
vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying, entering
into, or alighting from it."
Though "use" encompasses more than merely driving a car, it
is limited to its use "as a vehicle." This makes BRB available
primarily for activities for which the cost of automobile insur-
Survivors economic loss benefits, in the event of death occurring within
one year of the date of the accident, caused by and arising out of injuries
received in the accident, are subject to a maximum of $200 per week and
shall cover loss accruing after decedent's death of contributions of money or
tangible things of economic value, not including services, that his surviving
dependents would have received for their support during their dependency
from the decedent had he not suffered the injury causing death.
For the purposes of definition under Laws 1974, Chapter 408, the follow-
ing described persons shall be presumed to be dependents of a deceased
person:
(a) a wife is dependent on a husband with whom she lives at the time
of his death;
(b) a husband is dependent on a wife with whom he lives at the time
of her death;
(c) any child while under the age of 18 years, or while over that age
but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning, is dependent on the
parent with whom he is living or from whom he is receiving support regularly
at the time of the death of such parent. Questions of the existence and the
extent of dependency shall be questions of fact, considering the support
regularly received from the deceased.
Payments shall be made to the dependent, except that benefits to a
dependent who is a child or an incapacitated person may be paid to the
dependent's surviving parent or guardian. Payments shall be terminated
whenever the recipient ceases to maintain a status which if the decedent
were alive would be that of dependency.
KRS § 304.39-030(1) and (2) (Supp. 1976).
- KRS § 304.39-020(6) (Supp. 1976).
u Id. The Kentucky Act does not specifically define "maintenance" of a motor
vehicle. However, it defines "maintaining a motor vehicle" as having legal custody,
possession or responsibility for a motor vehicle by one other than the owner or operator.
KRS § 304.39-020(15) (Supp. 1976).
KENTUCKY No-FAULT
ance should be allocated.85 For example, if a person falls inside
a motor home while it is parked at a camp site, the resulting
injury would not be due to the use of a motor vehicle "as a
vehicle" and is therefore not covered.8 Furthermore, injuries
arising out of the operation of a garage are excluded if they
occur on the business premises.17 However, if the driver of a tow
truck is injured on the highway while servicing or repairing an
automobile, or if a mechanic is injured while road testing an
automobile, they are within the definition of use of a motor
vehicle "as a vehicle." 8
The scope of this coverage corresponds to Kentucky's pre-
no-fault insurance law. In United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Western Fire Insurance Co., 9 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that injuries sustained by a passenger in a moving
automobile when another passenger was loading a pistol which
discharged did not "arise out of the use" of an automobile
within the meaning of the owner's insurance policy. In
Kentucky Water Service Co. v. Selective Insurance Co.,9" the
Court held that where an insured was injured while helping a
water company employee fill a water tank on the insured's
truck, the water company and employee were not protected
users even though the insured's liability policy defined "use"
as including loading and unloading. Also in Wirth v. Maryland
Casualty Co.,9" a Federal court held that under Kentucky law
an eye injury sustained when a person was struck in the face
by a firecracker thrown from a parade float did not "arise out
of the ownership maintenance or use" of the float within the
meaning of the liability insurance policy.2
The unavailability of BRB for injuries arising out of the
loading or unloading of vehicles unless they occur while oc-
cupying, entering, or alighting from the vehicle makes this cov-
erage narrower than medical payments coverage under most
automobile insurance policies. This limitation, however, is con-
'UMVARA at § 1(6), Comment.
" Id.
- KRS § 304.39-020(6) (Supp. 1976).
"UMVARA § 1(6), Comment.
" 450 S.W.2d 491 (Ky. 1970).
*o 406 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1966).
" 368 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Ky. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1974).
32 Id.
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sistent with the basic philosophy of no-fault which is to provide
compensation for losses resulting directly from motoring acci-
dents."
Under the Kentucky Act, basic reparation insureds, driv-
ers, occupants of secured vehicles, and pedestrians and other
non-users are expressly entitled to BRB. As will be explained,
however, a fourth group, uninsured motorists, may also be eli-
gible for BRB.
A basic reparation insured includes the named insured of
an insurance contract complying with the Act's BRB coverage
requirements, residents of the named insured's household who
are not named insureds in another insurance contract, the
spouse and other relatives of the named insured, and minors
in the custody of the named insured or other relatives residing
in the same household if they customarily make their home
with the same family unit. This is true even though they tem-
porarily live elsewhere. 4
Courts have relied upon what has been called the
"common roof" doctrine to further define this class of persons."
If separate living quarters are maintained, a person may be
barred recovery of BRB even though the closest of relationships
exist. For example, a brother-in-law, son-in-law, a married
brother, a married sister, a married son, and a granddaughter
have been denied coverage when it was found that they were
not "under the common roof of the named insured." There are
some exceptions to the "common roof" doctrine, however: an
estranged husband or wife,97 a minor child in the insured's
custody,98 a child who has left home for certain purposes," and
cases involving partnerships which are the named insured.110
It is important to determine who is a basic reparation in-
sured because this group is entitled to broader coverage. BRB
are available to basic reparation insureds while occupying the
, UMVARA at § 1(6), Comment.
' KRS § 304.39-020(3) (Supp. 1976).
'5 SCHERMER, supra note 19, at § 3.02[2].
Id. at n.19.
'7 Citizens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Community Services Ins., 238 N.W.2d 182 (Mich.
1975). See also SCHERMER, supra note 19, § 3.02[2], at 3-10, n.19.
" SCHERMER, supra note 19, at § 3.02[2].
Id. at n.22.
110 Hartford Accident & Idem. Co. v. Huddleston, 514 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1974).
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secured or any other vehicle, or when struck as a pedestrian. '
This coverage is available for both instate and out-of-state ac-
cidents as long as they occur within the United States, its
territories and possessions, or Canada."2 Although the Ken-
tucky No-Fault Insurance Information Council, in a prepared
talk given sometime between the Act's enactment and its effec-
tive date, indicated that the insured would be protected out-
of-state only while occupying his own insured vehicle, ' this is
incorrect. This erroneous information was widely disseminated
through insurance agency workshops and the news media, at a
time when only the Delaware No-Fault Act restricted coverage
to accidents involving the insured vehicle.' 4 Kentucky has no
such restriction.
The driver and occupants of a secured vehicle who are not
basic reparations insureds, however, are afforded these same
out-of-state BRB benefits only if they occupy a secured vehi-
cle.1
05
A pedestrian or non-user is afforded BRB coverage any
time the injury results from an automobile accident in Ken-
tucky.'0 ' The source of these BRB payments will be discussed
later.' 7 Only a basic reparation insured will be afforded BRB
coverage if the accident occurs while the insured is a pedestrian
outside of Kentucky.0 8 A pedestrian, as used in the No-Fault
Act, "means any person who is not an operator or user of a
motor vehicle at the time his injury occurs."'' Traditionally, a
"pedestrian" was one traveling by foot rather than in a convey-
ance."0 The Act's definition of motor vehicle, however, makes
Kentucky's definition much broader. KRS § 304.39.020(7)(a)
1' KRS § 304.39-030(2)(b) (Supp. 1976).
282 KRS § 304.39.030(2) (Supp. 1976).
J" Kentucky No-Fault Insurance Information Council, 727 Starks Building,
Louisville, Kentucky 40202.
2M4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit.21 § 2118(a) (1973).
"' KRS § 304.39-030(2)(b) (Supp. 1976). The definition of "occupying" is within
the definition of the use of a motor vehicle. This has had extensive judicial interpreta-
tion in Kentucky. See supra notes 89 to 91 and accompanying text.
IN KRS § 304.39-030(1) (Supp. 1976).
'7 See infra text accompanying notes 135 to 164.
'u KRS § 304.39-030(2)(a) (Supp. 1976). In Kentucky a pedestrian is not consid-
ered a separate category of insured.
," KRS § 304.39-050(1) (Supp. 1976).
2' SCHERMER, supra note 19, § 3.04, at 3.14, n.5.
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defines a motor vehicle as one "required to be registered under
KRS Chapter 186."111 Therefore, if a person is in a conveyance
not required to be registered, he is a pedestrian. In Utah, an
appellate court held that an insured was a pedestrian within
the meaning of his accident policy when he was crushed to
death while tinkering with a tractor.112 Likewise, when a snow-
mobile hit a secured vehicle in New York, the driver of the
snowmobile collected benefits as a pedestrian since a snowmo-
bile was exempted from the definition of a motor vehicle."'
An uninsured is also entitled to BRB coverage except when
injured as an occupant of his own uninsured vehicle.1 Nothing
in the Act precludes an uninsured motorist from having BRB
coverage when he is involved in an accident as a pedestrian, an
occupant of a motor vehicle other than his own, or even an
operator of a vehicle other than his own. The Department of
" The basic statute covering registration of motor vehicles is KRS § 186.020
which requires registration of a motor vehicle other than a motor vehicle engaged in
the transportation of passengers for hire operating under a certificate of convenience
and necessity. "Motor Vehicle" is defined in KRS §§ 186.010(4) and (7). the Commis-
sioner of Insurance further defined "motor vehicle" in accordance with KRS § 304.39-
020(7). See § 806 Ky. ADMiN. REo. 39:010 § 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as KAR):
Section 2(7) of the Act states that: "Motor vehicle means a vehicle of a kind
required to be registered under KRS Chapter 186." The phrase, "vehicle of
a kind," is interpreted to mean all vehicles which transport persons or prop-
erty upon the public highways of the Commonwealth, propelled by other
than muscular power, except road rollers, road graders, farm tractors, vehi-
cles on which power shovels are mounted, such other construction equipment
customarily used only on the site of construction and which is not practical
for the transportation of persons or property upon the highways, such vehi-
cles as travel exclusively upon rails, and such vehicles as are propelled by
electric power obtained from overhead wires while being operated within any
municipality or where said vehicles do not travel more than five (5) miles
beyond the city limit of any municipality.
112 Peterson v. Continental Cas. Co., 483 P.2d 445 (Utah 1971). Because he was a
pedestrian, this insured was entitled to double indemnity under his policy.
" McConnel v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 359 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
" KRS § 304.39-160(4) (Supp. 1976):
A person who sustains injury while occupying a motor vehicle owned by such
person and with respect to which seccurity is required by the provisions on
security and who fails to have such security in effect at the time of an
accident in this Commonwealth causing such injury, shall not obtain
through the assigned claims plan basic reparation benefits, including bene-
fits otherwise due him as a survivor, unless such person's failure to have such
security in effect at the tine of such accident was solely occasioned by the
failure of the reparation obligor of such person to provide the basic reparation
benefits required by this subtitle.
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Insurance has taken the position that coverage is denied only
if the uninsured motorist is the operator of his own uninsured
motor vehicle and not if he is only a passenger therein.115 This
position, however, is clearly erroneous given the unequivocal
language of KRS § 304.39-160(4)."'
Uninsured motorists are not so fortunate in other states.
For example, in Staley v. Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insur-
ance Co. 117 the Florida Court of Appeals held that the owner of
an uninsured motor vehicle who was injured while riding as a
passenger in a secured motor vehicle could not recover BRB
from the owner's insurer. Even in Florida, however, the minor
children of the uninsured motorists are entitled to BRB cover-
age even if injured in their parents' uninsured vehicle."'
3. Exemptions From BRB
Although people who have affirmatively rejected the limi-
tation upon their tort rights as provided for in KRS § 304.39-
060(4) are not entitled to BRB,"19 they may purchase BRB cov-
erage as part of their insurance policy. 2 ' Another class of per-
sons is considered to have rejected the limitation on their tort
rights and consequently is not entitled to BRB. KRS § 304.39-
060(4) provides that
any person, at the time of an accident, who does not have
basic reparation insurance but has not formally rejected such
limitations of his tort rights and liabilities and has at such
"I Interview with Mr. Tom Dixon, Chief Enforcment Officer, Department of In-
surance, in Frankfort, Kentucky, Sept. 14, 1976.
' See supra note 113.
' 328 So. 2d 241, 242 (Fla. App. 1976), interpreting FLA. STAT. ANN. §
627.736(4)(d):
The insurer of the owner of a motor vehicle shall pay personal injury protec-
tion benefits for:
4. Accidental bodily injury sustained in this state by any other person while
occupying the owner's motor vehicle. . . provided the injured person is not
himself:
a. The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to which security is
required under [this Act]. . ..
h, See Farley v. Bateway Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 177 (Fla. App. 1974); Gateway Ins.
Co. v. Butler, 293 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1974).
"' KRS § 304.39-030(1) (Supp. 1976).
'' KRS § 304.39-140(5) (Supp. 1976).
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time in effect security equivalent to that required by KRS
304.39-110 shall be deemed to have fully rejected such limita-
tions within meaning of this section for that accident only.
By necessity this section refers to a driver of an automobile
from a state without no-fault who has $10,000/$20,000/$5,000
liability coverage consistent with KRS § 304.39-110.
KRS § 304.39-190 also disqualifies the converter of a motor
vehicle from receiving BRB or added reparation benefits from
any source other than his own insurance."2 ' The converter who
is also a basic reparation insured, however, will collect from his
own policy, while other converters, who would normally recover
from the security on the vehicle in which they were riding 12 or
from the assigned claims plan,123 are prohibited from so doing.
In addition, KRS § 304.39-200 provides that a person who
intentionally causes or attempts to cause injury to himself or
another person is disqualified from basic or added reparation
benefits for any resulting injury. This section is more punitive
than the exclusion for a motor vehicle "converter" in that a
person who intends to cause injury is precluded from recovering
benefits from any source including a policy under which he is
a basic reparation insured.' 24 Under this provision,
[a] person intentionally causes or attempts to cause injury
if he acts or fails to act for the purpose of causing the injury.
A person does not intentionally cause or attempt to cause
injury merely because his act or failure to act is intentional
or done with his realization that it creates a grave risk of
causing injury, or if the act or omission causing the injury is
for the purpose of averting bodily harm to himself or another
person.'
Therefore, Kentucky, like Connecticut,'26 Minnesota,
1'
and Pennsylvania28 has provided the courts with guidelines. A
121 The test for "conversion" is whether the injured person used "the motor vehicle
in the good faith belief that he [was] legally entitled to do so." KRS § 304.39-190
(Supp. 1976).
"n KRS § 304.39-050(1) (Supp. 1976).
" KRS § 304.39-160(1) (Supp. 1976).
,21 KRS § 304.39-200 (Supp. 1976).
125 Id.
,21 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 38-332 (1975).
'2' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.60 (Supp. 1975).
' PA. STAT. ANN. § 1009.208(b) (Supp. 1974).
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specific intent to cause injury must exist unless the person
knows that injury will follow as a consequence of his conduct.'29
"Whether intent or knowledge can be attributed to the insured
on the basis that the nature of the act was of such a character
as to imply intent or knowledge is an open question."""0
In addition to excluding the injured party because of cer-
tain conduct, Kentucky also prohibits his survivors or benefici-
aries from receiving benefits. 3' While the exclusion of the in-
jured individual is designed to deter undesirable behavior in
the operation of motor vehicles, it is not clear that this purpose
is furthered by denying benefits to the survivors or beneficiaries
of the person engaging in the wrongful conduct.
Although Kentucky has excluded BRB coverage for inju-
ries resulting from certain specific conduct, it does not attempt
to deter conduct to the extent done by other states. Some states
withdraw BRB coverage for injuries received while committing
a felony or seeking to avoid arrest,1 2 driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or narcotics,' 3  and preparing for or participat-
ing in a drag race.'
34
4. Source of BRB Coverage
As indicated above, the vast majority of persons who suffer
injuries arising out of an auto accident in Kentucky are entitled
to BRB coverage. Once entitlement is determined, the source
of BRB payments must be considered.
In Kentucky, the injured person looks primarily to the
vehicle involved in the accident. If the person is injured while
occupying a vehicle, BRB are recoverable from the security on
that vehicle.'35 Likewise, a pedestrian struck by a vehicle re-
ceives coverage from that vehicle's insurance.' 3 ' This priority
for finding coverage primarily with the vehicle, however, is
contrary to the emphasis established in UMVARA § 4(c)(1).'
3
'2 SCHERMER, supra note 19, § 403, at 4-5, n.19.
' Id. § 4.02 at 5.
131 KRS § 304.39-190 and 304.39-200 (Supp. 1976).
132 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(2)(b) (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-7 (1973).
' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.736(2)(b) (1972).
' ORE. REv. STAT. § 523.5 (1971).
1' KRS § 304.39-050(1) (Supp. 1976).
13 Id.
I" UMVARA at § 4(c)(1):
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Under the UMVARA the coverage follows the person and not
the vehicle. For instance, basic reparation insureds are covered
by their own first party insurance, regardless of the place of
injury, even if they are injured while occupying or struck by a
vehicle owned by someone not a basic reparations insured."8
This priority of coverage has been criticized by two insurance
authorities,'39 a fact not unknown to the drafters of Kentucky's
Act.' 4
0
In Kentucky a person injured by a vehicle not covered by
no-fault may recover through any insurance contract under
which he is a basic reparation insured.'4' In addition, if there
is security on the responsible vehicle, but the insurer fails to
pay the injured party within 30 days of receiving reasonable
proof of the injury and the amount of the loss, the injured
person can again recover benefits from his own basic reparation
policy. 42 An injured party, however, except as provided in KRS
§ 304.39-140 (4) which allows recovery of benefits from more
than one insurer where there is a disparity in the amount of the
deductibles, cannot recover BRB from more than one repara-
The security for payment of basic reparation benefits applicable to injury to
a basic reparation insured is the security under which the injured person is
a basic reparations insured.
I' !d.
, ' Ghiardi & Kircher, The Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act: An
Analysis and Critique, 23 FED. INS. COUNSEL Q. 47 (1973).
Coverage following the person under UMVARA will result in a change
in present insurance practices, with the following results:
1. It will militate against developing a rating system even re-
motely tied to causation and exposure.
2. The number of claim files opened after an accident and, there-
fore, the amount of administrative expense will not depend upon
the number of cars involved but upon the number of persons in the
cars who are insured by different insurers. Every insurer will have
to confirm coverage and record statistical data on the same claim
for each person insured.
3. Smaller insurers operating on a sectional basis will be placed
at a further disadvantage because they will not have the adjusting
and administrative facilities available to those handling claims
nationwide.
Id. at 64.
"I Interview with Pat Able, Special Assistant to Governor Julian Carroll, in
Frankfort, Kentucky, Sept. 19, 1976.
"I KRS § 304.39-050(2) (Supp. 1976).
142 KRS § 304.39-050(1) (Supp. 1976).
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tions obligor or recover in excess of $10,000 as a result of any
one accident.'
43
While this is true, there are situations where the injured
person, though entitled to BRB because his injury is covered
by the Act, is unable to recover from the above mentioned
sources. In all situations where BRB is inapplicable, except
when the injured person converted the vehicle or had the acci-
dent with the intent to cause injury, payment may be obtained
through the assigned claims plan."' Payment is made through
this plan when a person entitled to receive BRB coverage suf-
fers a loss which no other insurance covers.'45 For example, a
person injured in Kentucky while a passenger in a motor vehi-
cle where neither he nor the owner is insured can recover under
the assigned claims plan.' An uninsured pedestrian, struck by
an uninsured vehicle can also recover from this plan.'47
In addition, an injured person may recover from the plan
if basic reparation insurance cannot be identified, even though
it is possible or probable that some basic reparation insurance
in fact exists.' This would be the case with hit-and-run driv-
ers.1
49
Furthermore, recovery through the plan may be had when
the insurer of the motor vehicle is financially unable to pay,' 9
or if the claim for BRB is rejected for a reason other than the
injured person not being entitled to benefits."' This section
applies, for example, where an insurer refuses to pay on the
belief that BRB should be paid by another source, or where an
out-of-state insurer argues that it is unconstitutional for Ken-
tucky to require payment of such benefits. 52 Where the insur-
ance company refuses to pay on the grounds that the claimant
is not entitled to benefits because no loss was suffered or be-
13 KRS § 304.39-050(3) (Supp. 1976). A person can, however, purchase additional
reparation benefits to supplement initial BRB. See KRS § 304.39-140(5) (Supp. 1976).
'" KRS § 304.39-160(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
,15 UMVARA at § 18, Comment. Kentucky has adopted UMVARA § 18(a)(1).
KRS § 304.39-160(1)(a) (Supp. 1976).
"I UMVARA at § 18(a)(1), Comment.
147 Id.
I KRS § 304.39-160(1)(b) (Supp. 1976).
"' UMVARA at § 18(a)(3), Comment.
5'6 KRS § 304.39-160(1)(c) (Supp. 1976).
"' KRS § 304.39-160(1)(d) (Supp. 1976).
252 UMVARA at § 18(a)(5), Comment.
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cause the loss did not arise through the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of a motor vehicle, however, the claimant cannot
use KRS § 304.39-160(1) (d) to recover from the assigned claims
plan.
53
There is another exception to recovery under the plan. A
person injured while "occupying" his own vehicle cannot re-
cover benefits through assigned claims if he failed to carry the
proper insurance as required by the Act.'54 If the security was
not in effect only because the injured owner/occupant's insur-
ance company failed to provide the basic reparation coverage,
however, the injured person can recover through assigned
claims.155
Upon receipt of BRB through the assigned claims plan,
any benefits or advantages the claimant receives or is entitled
to receive as a result of the injury are subtracted in calculating
the net loss.' 6 Benefits or advantages received by way of suc-
cession at death, death benefits from life insurance, or dis-
charge of family support obligations, however, are not sub-
tracted.'57
The injured person must present his claim to the Assigned
Claims Bureau within the time an action for benefits could
have been commenced if identifiable coverage had been in ef-
fect. ' Few people, however, are aware of the Assigned Claims
Bureau and its procedures for presenting a claim. This is evi-
dent from a recent Bureau report to the Commissioner of Insur-
ance. As of May 11, 1976, only 67 claims had been submitted
and less than $28,000 in benefits had been paid.'5 These figures
are not surprising considering the Bureau's lack of public visi-
bility; only after seeing two officials of the Department of In-
surance did these authors discover the address of the Assigned
15 Id.
' KRS § 304.39-160(4) (Supp. 1976).
155 Id.
'- KRS § 304.39-160(3) (Supp. 1976). This calculation of net loss does not apply
where the injured person has assigned his claim because a reparation obligor has
rejected his request for benefits for reasons other than his entitlement to benefits under
KRS § 304.39-160(1)(d) (Supp. 1976).
"S Id.
'' KRS § 304.39-180(1) '(Supp. 1976).
,' Internal Report, dated May 11, 1976. Received from Mr. Tom Dixon, Chief
Enforcement Officer, Kentucky Department of Insurance.
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Claims Bureau. Further, although KRS § 304.39-300 empowers
the Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate rules for the
effective administration of the Act,' there is no mention of the
Bureau in the Kentucky Administrative Register. The rules for
the administration and operation of the Assigned Claims Plan
and Bureau can be obtained only through a written request.''
It is extremely doubtful that no-fault's purpose of providing
prompt payment to victims for their economic damages can be
furthered if the functioning of this Bureau continues at its
present low profile.
The Kentucky Assigned Claims Plan is made up of repara-
tion obligors, insurance companies as well as self-insureds who
qualify with the Kentucky Department of Insurance to provide
BRB coverage.'62 This membership is logical since the insur-
ance companies are assessed to provide the plan's funds.'
While the Commissioner of Insurance has the power to appoint
no less than three nor more than eleven persons to a Governing
Committee which is responsible for adopting rules and regula-
tions and overseeing the plan,' 4 there is no requirement that
any public interest be represented in the plan. This may ac-
count for the low visibility of the assigned claims plan; the
insurance companies responsible for its solvency are also re-
sponsible for its visibility and administration. This vested in-
terest should be minimized by providing for representation
by the public and practicing attorneys.
D. Limitation of Tort Rights
1. Extent of Tort Limitation
KRS § 304.39-060(1) provides that "[a]ny person who
1,8 Chapter 13 of KRS requires rules and regulations to be published in the Ken-
tucky Administrative Register. Whether these regulations come within the ambit of
KRS § 13.095 is not within the scope of this Note.
M A copy of the Assigned Claims Plan and the rules and regulations for its admin-
istration may be obtained by writing:
Kentucky Assigned Claims Plan
205 Marion E. Taylor Building
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
"2 Rules and Regulations to the Operation and Administration of the Kentucky
Assigned Claim Plan and Bureau, supra note 161.
,,3 Kentucky Assigned Claims Plan, supra note 161.
16" Id.
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registers, operates, maintains or uses a motor vehicle on the
public roadways of this Commonwealth shall, as a condition of
such registration . . . be deemed to have accepted . . . [the
limitation of his tort rights]." This is a partial limitation, how-
ever, because it applies only to accidents occurring within Ken-
tucky. Although the Kentucky legislature has no power to af-
fect a person's conduct outside the state, parties involved in an
accident in Kentucky have had sufficient contact with the
state to enable its courts to apply Kentucky law.' 6
While this limitation is generally assumed, "[t]ort liabil-
ity is not so limited for injury to a person who is not an owner,
operator, maintainer or user of a motor vehicle. ... "66 These
individuals are by necessity pedestrians' 7 who do not own an
automobile registered in Kentucky, maintain an automobile in
Kentucky, and are not basic reparations insureds. Problems
arise, however, because the meaning of the term "maintenance
of an automobile" is not clear. It is defined in the Act as "hav-
ing legal custody, possession or responsibility for a motor vehi-
cle by one other than an owner or operator.""'6 This is appar-
ently intended to cover bailments for repair or the simple bor-
rowing of another's automobile. The UMVARA, however, de-
"' For a more detailed analysis see the Conflict of Laws section, accompanying
notes 267 to 280 infra.
"I KRS § 304.39-060(2)(c) (Supp. 1976).
,67 A pedestrian is defined as one "who is not an operator or user of a motor vehicle
at the time his injury occurs." KRS § 304.39-050(1) (Supp. 1976). This conclusion is
somewhat more restrictive than the Court's interpretation in Fann v. McGuffey, 534
S.W.2d 770, 774 (Ky. 1975):
This limitation upon recovery for pain, suffering, mental anguish and
"inconvenience" does not apply if the plaintiff was not an "owner, operator,
maintainer or user" of an automobile. Hence it does not apply to an injured
pedestrian unless at the time of the accident he owns or maintains an auto-
mobile, or is an operator or user in the sense that upon occasion he drives,
uses, or has driven or used an automobile on the roadways of this state." In
this special respect, one who "uses" an automobile (e.g., a passenger) is not
a "user" unless he is a named insured in a policy with BRB coverage or is
covered as a member of the named insured's household. [Other footnotes
omitted].
In footnote 19, the Court left open the question of how much operation or use will
suffice to make one an operator or user who is fully subject to no-fault limitations.
Under KRS § 304.39-050(1), however, the time of the accident is determinative; if the
injured party is a pedestrian at this time, he is treated as a pedestrian regardless of
how often he might operate a vehicle.
, KRS § 304.39-020(15) (Supp. 1976).
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fines use and maintenance together,' 9 and both the Kentucky
Act and the UMVARA define "use" in terms of use as a vehi-
cle.'7
0
The most confusing area involves whether a minor injured
as a pedestrian is within the category of persons who are not
registrants, operators, maintainers, or users of a motor vehicle.
Obviously, a young child does not own, operate, or maintain a
motor vehicle and when injured as a pedestrian is not using the
motor vehicle at the time of the accident. KRS § 304.39-
020(14), however defines "user" as "a person who is a basic
reparation insured or would be a basic reparation insured if
such person had not rejected the limitation upon his tort rights
as provided in KRS § 304.39-060(4)." Therefore, if the minor
is a basic reparations insured on his parents' insurance policy'
7'
or if the parents failed to reject their tort rights limitation in
accordance with KRS § 304.39-060(4), the minor is a user and
subject to the tort right limitation.
The extent of a person's tort rights limitations is defined
in KRS 88 304.060(2)(a) and (b).
(a) Tort liability with respect to accidents occurring in this
Commonwealth and arising from the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of a motor vehicle is "abolished" for damages
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease to the extent the
basic reparation benefits provided in this subtitle are payable
therefor, or that would be payable but for any deductible
authorized by this subtitle, under any insurance policy or
other method of security complying with the requirements of
this subtitle, except to the extent non economic detriment
qualifies under subsection (2)(b) hereof.
(b) In any action of tort brought against the owner, regis-
trant, operator or occupant of a motor vehicle with respect to
which security has been provided as required in this subtitle,
or against any person or organization legally responsible for
his acts or omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort
for pain, suffering mental anguish and inconvenience because
of bodily injury, sickness or disease arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance, operation or use of such motor vehicle
"' UMVARA at § 1(6).
'IQ KRS § 304.39-020(6); UMVARA at § 1(6). See also KRS § 304.39-020(6) (Supp.
1976).
"' See supra text accompanying note 94.
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only in the event that the benefits which are payble for such
injury as "medical expense" or which would be payable but
for any exclusion or deductible authorized by this subtitle
exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), or the injury or disease
consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigurement, a
fracture to a weight-bearing bone, a compound comminuted,
displaced or compressed fracture, loss of a body member,
permanent injury within reasonable medical probability, per-
manent loss of bodily function or death.
The importance of the phrase "arising from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle" cannot be overemphas-
ized; this phrase establishes the scope of the tort liability limi-
tation. Many people injured in a motor vehicle will not find
their tort rights limited, because from the defendant's perspec-
tive, the accident did not arise out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of a motor vehicle. 7 2 One authority states that
this would include: accidents caused by a defect in the manu-
facture or design of the automobile, car-train collisions, and
highway contractors and other people who cause accidents
through construction, installation, or maintenance of traffic
control devices, or obstruction of roadways.Y1
3
Stated in overly simplistic terms, KRS §§ 304.39-060(2) (a)
and (b) are important because a tortfeasor covered by these
provisions is exempt from suit to the extent of the economic
benefits available under BRB and is also exempt from damages
for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and inconvenience unless
the medical expenses exceed $1,000 or the injuries fall into
those specifically enumerated categories.
7 1
"' O'CONNELL & HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND 397 (1975).
173 Id.
174 KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b) (Supp. 1976). The threshold requirement is jurisdic-
tional in nature; before a court can hear the suit, the plaintiff must place in contro-
versy, by a good faith complaint, the requisite elements which under the statute entitle
him to bring suit. Wooten v. Collins, 327 So. 2d 795 (Fla. App. 1976); Sullivan v.
Darling, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1975); cf., Snyder v. Laffer, 367 N.Y.S.2d 454
(Sup. Ct. 1975). Some courts place the burden on the plaintiff to establish at trial that
his injuries satisfy the threshold requirement; the defendant need not affirmatively
plead the plaintiff's failure to meet the threshold. See, e.g., Seskine v. Cone, 353 A.2d
558 (N.J. Superior Ct. 1976). Contra, Fennell v. Ferreira, 335 A.2d 84 (N.J. Superior
Ct. 1975) (defendant must prove his exemption from tort liability as an affirmative
defense); Snyder v. Laffer, 367 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (defendant's affirmative
defense was defective; the issue of whether the plaintiff passed the threshold was to
[Vol. 65
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The threshold requirement does not apply, however, when
a person is injured by a motor vehicle operator who has pro-
perly rejected his tort right limitation. The injured person
"may claim his full damages, including nonpecuniary dam-
ages, or if such injured person has not rejected his own tort
limitations, he may also claim basic reparation benefits from
the appropriate security on the vehicle . ... ,5 On the other
hand, the Act does not set out any exception to the threshold
requirement when the person is injured by an operator of an
uninsured vehicle who has not rejected his tort right limitation.
This irony is apparent when one considers what happens to the
out-of-state insured:
any person who, at the time of an accident, who [sic] does
not have basic reparation insurance but has not formally re-
jected such limitations of his tort rights and liabilities and
has at such time in effect security equivalent to that required
by KRS 304.39-110 shall be deemed to have fully rejected
such limitations within meaning of this section for that acci-
dent only.''
Because it is highly unlikely that a Kentucky resident will have
security equivalent to that required by KRS § 304.39-110, not
have BRB coverage and not have had the opportunity to reject
the limitation on his tort rights, this provision applies primar-
be determined at trial). The issue of whether a plaintiffs injuries have put him over
the threshold requirement is a mixed question of law and fact. Where the facts as
shown in the pleadings are sufficiently clear to enable the court to decide the issues as
a matter of law, it should do so, but where the facts show a genuine dispute as to
whether the plaintiff has sustained the requisite threshold injury, the issue should be
submitted to a jury for determination. Davis v. Pathe Cab Corp., 377 N.Y.S.2d 893
(Civil Ct. 1975); Sullivan v. Darling, 367 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. 1975). One court has
held that whether the plaintiff was "permanently injured" should be determined by
the jury. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 305 So. 2d 275 (Fla. App. 1975). Another court has
held that the phrases "serious injury" and "significant disfigurement" are unconstitu-
tionally vague and therefore violate the equal protection clause. Montgomery v. Dan-
iels, 367 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
Where the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently overcomes the threshold and shows his
entitlement to maintain the suit, but the jury nevertheless finds that his injuries were
not sufficient to meet the threshold, the plaintiff is barred from recovery in that suit;
however, he is without prejudice to maintain the suit at a later time if his damages
reach the threshold. Cole v. Berkowitz, 373 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Civil Ct. 1975); Wooten v.
Collins, 327 So. 2d 795 (Fla. App. 1976) (the jury's finding that the plaintiff's injuries
did not meet the threshold deprived the court of jurisdiction).
17 KRS § 304.39-060(7) (Supp. 1976).
176 KRS § 304.39-060(4) (Supp. 1976).
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ily to nonresident motorists. It is very probable that a nonresi-
dent will have the required $10,000/$20,000/$5,000 coverage
from an insurance policy issued in a state without no-fault. As
a result, an injured party may not sue an uninsured Kentucky
resident without meeting the threshold requirement although
he can sue an insured nonresident motorist in addition to col-
lecting BRB.
Confusion has also arisen concerning the extent to which
the threshold requirement of KRS § 304.39-060(2)(b) limits an
injured person's rights in tort. This question was clarified in
Fann v. McGuffey:177
KRS 304.39-060(2)(a) and (b) lack some degree of clarity,
partially because, it is said, subsection (b) was lifted out of
context from the Florida statute. Apparently there has been
some thought that KRS 304.39-060(2)(b) not only restricts
recovery for pain, suffering, mental anguish and "in-
convenience" but also limits it to those items of damage, thus
eliminating, for example, the element of destruction or per-
manent impairment of earning capacity. But we see nothing
to call for such a construction. Read carefully in this aspect,
the statute says only that unless the threshold requirement
is satisfied there can be no recovery of these particular, enu-
merated elements of damage."'
As surprising as this interpretation may seem, it is not incon-
sistent with the interpretation given similar sections by courts
in other states. For example, in Barker v. Scott, 79 a New York
Supreme Court held that New York's no-fault legislation did
not abrogate a spouse's common law right to sue for loss of
services, society and companionship of his wife. Read in light
of the limitation imposed by Fann, the threshold requirement
would not limit a tort suit for aggravation of a pre-existing
disease or physical condition, impairment of a physical or men-
tal ability, fright and shock, humiliation, indignity and insult,
loss of consortium, loss of earning capacity, and temporary
disability.
' 534 S.W.2d 770 (Ky. 1975) (footnotes omitted).
,' Id. at 774.
"' 365 N.Y.S.2d 756 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
[Vol. 65
KENTUCKY NO-FAULT
2. Option to Reject
Any person may reject the limitation on his tort rights and
liabilities by filing a written rejection with the Department of
Insurance,"' which takes effect upon receipt by the Depart-
ment.'1 This rejection is effective for 5 years from the date of
execution, but may be revoked at any time."' Members of the
same household may indicate their rejection on the same form,
but each individual must execute the form on his own behalf
unless he is under legal disability,183 at which time the limita-
tion can be rejected by the natural parent or legal guardian.
8 4
A person whose legal disability is removed is not deemed to
have accepted the limitation until 6 months have expired from
the time the no-fault law would have otherwise become applic-
able to him.85 The ability of a parent or guardian to reject or
waive rejection on behalf of a minor or other person under legal
disability came under sharp attack in Fann. The Court dis-
missed this criticism saying:
The argument that a parent waives his child's right to sue by
failing to exercise the right of rejection for him misses the
point that it is the child's act in using an automobile; or the
parent's act in causing or permitting him to do so, that sub-
jects him to the limitations imposed by the no-fault law. As
expressly stated in KRS 304.39-060(1), implied consent to the
law hangs on one's use of the highways, not on the failure to
reject, which really is in the nature of an added attraction."'
The Court further based its decision on the prerogative of
the state to define the authority of a parent to act for a child.
Parents and custodians of persons under disability necessar-
ily have the liberty to exercise or forego many options affect-
, KRS § 304.39-060(4) (Supp. 1976).
, 806 KAR 39:030 § 5 (1976). But see KRS § 304.39-060 (4) (1976) which implies
that the rejection becomes effective when executed and filed with the Department of
Insurance. This form, approved by the Department of Insurance, is to be furnished by
the reparations obligor to each prospective applicant. KRS § 304.39-060(6) (Supp.
1976).
U KRS § 304.39-060(5) (Supp. 1976).
'= 806 KAR 39:030 § 2 (1976).
,1 KRS § 304.39-060(4) (Supp. 1976).
IA5 Id.
I" Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Ky. 1975).
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ing the rights and welfare of the child or ward. A next friend
may file suit for an infant, waive trial by jury, and lose the
case, all without let or hindrance.'
E. Mandatory Insurance Coverage
Except for governmental units, every owner of a motor
vehicle registered or operated in Kentucky shall continuously
provide insurance by contract or by self-insurance. This insur-
ance must provide payment for personal injuries with mini-
mum coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident
and property damage with minimum coverage of $5,000. The
insurance must also provide BRB. ss The definition of motor
vehicle applicable here is the same as that discussed in consid-
eration of BRB coverage and tort right limitations.
KRS §§ 304.39-080(3) and (4) provide that governmental
units may provide such security.'89 Governmental units are not
subject to the Act and need take no affirmative action unless
and until they elect to become "obligated governments."'" 0
When this occurs the government may meet its obligations by
providing security through an insurance contract or by obligat-
ing itself to pay BRB in accordance with the Act. 9' In Fann the
Court held that the exclusion of governmental units was not an
unreasonable classification and thereby did not offend section
59 of the Kentucky Constitution.'92
Although self-insurance is allowed, it is not without re-
strictions. KRS § 304.39-080(7) empowers the Commissioner of
Insurance to approve applications and to set standards which
" Id. (footnote omitted).
IM KRS § 304.39-110 (Supp. 1976) (minimum security); KRS § 304.39-080(5)(c)
(Supp. 1976) (type of security).
I" KRS § 304.39-080(3) and (4) (Supp. 1976):
(3) This Commonwealth, its political subdivisions, municipal corporations,
and public agencies may ....
(4) The United States and its public agencies and any 6ther state, its
political subdivisions, municipal corporation, and public agencies may
The "may" was changed from "shall" by House Amendment 5 because the require-
ment that a government "shall" provide security was in conflict with the idea that such
entities were exempt from the compulsory insurance requirements. House Journal for
1974 at 1537.
" 806 KAR 39.040 § 1 (1976).
", Id. at § 2.
1,2 Farm v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 779 (Ky. 1975).
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self-insurers must continually meet. The Kentucky Adminis-
trative Regulations further define the criteria that must be met
by an applicant for self-insurance and the grounds on which the
commissioner may revoke the self-insurer status.9 ' The more
important of these criteria require the applicant to agree in
writing to pay all tort liability and BRB incurred and required
by the Act, agree to become a member of the Kentucky Arbi-
tration Association and Assigned Claims Plan, file annual fi-
nancial statements with the Commissioner of Insurance, and
furnish a bond to meet his obligations or deposit cash or other
assets of the kind which may be deposited by a domestic in-
surer with the Custodian of Insurance Securities. The mini-
mum self-insurance security requirement is $50,000 for one se-
cured vehicle and $10,000 for each additional vehicle up to
$200,000.
94
Although Kentucky's insurance requirement is manda-
tory, it is not compulsory. Because it is not compulsory, it is
not necessary to show proof of insurance before motor vehicle
registration or the issuance of a license. The UMVARA § 7(j)
provides that "[a] motor vehicle may not be registered in this
State unless evidence satisfactory to the [registrar of motor
vehicles] is furnished that security has been provided as re-
quired by this section." Kentucky opted for the less restrictive
alternative,'9 5 as did many other states; only Massachusetts, 9 '
New York,' 7 and North Carolina'98 have enacted compulsory
insurance legislation.
The subject of compulsory insurance has been very contro-
versial. 9  Although Kentucky's noncompulsory scheme is prob-
" 806 KAR 39:050 (1976).
I !d,
"N KRS § 304.39-090. This provision coincides with UMVARA § 7(j), Comment.
"' MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34A-34J; ch. 175, §§ 113A-113H (1971).
,, N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. §§ 310-321 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
IN N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309-319 (1965).
" It has been argued that it is the compulsory nature of insurance and not just
the existence of no-fault which is responsible for the lowering of insurance premium
costs. Brainard, Kentucky Bill Offers Motorists a Choice Between Tort and No-fault,
41 INs. Cou. J. 244, 246 (1974). This is the same analysis used, however, to support
the argument that a more effective method of providing insurance is through the
imposition of compulsory requirements on the traditional tort system insurance.
Thanks to compulsory insurance, many more cars (it was assumed)
would be insured under no-fault than under tort, a voluntary system in all
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ably the most used and best reasoned approach, it fnay not be
consistent with the expected rate reduction which the legisla-
ture made mandatory by KRS § 304.39-330.
Instead of compulsory insurance, Kentucky enforces its
mandatory insurance by stating that:
An owner of a motor vehicle registered in this Commonwealth
who ceases to maintain security as required by the provisions
on security may not operate or permit operation of the vehicle
in this Commonwealth until security has again been provided
as required by this subtitle. All other owners shall provide
such security while operating a motor vehicle in this Com-
monwealth.200
KRS § 304.99-050 further provides a penalty for violation of
this provision:
An owner or registrant of a motor vehicle with respect to
which security is required by this subtitle, who operates the
motor vehicle or permits it to be operated in this Common-
wealth without having in full force and effect security
complying with KRS 304.39-110, shall be fined not less than
fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than five hundred dollars
($500.00).
For the person who rejects the limitations on his tort rights
pursuant to KRS § 304.39-060(4) to comply with these compul-
sory insurance provisions, he must provide the minimum liabil-
ity and BRB coverage required by KRS § 304.39-110.211 To
three states. This raised a pertinent question. If the average per car rate
could be lowered under no-fault by resort to compulsory insurance, what
would happen to the average per car rate under tort if that system were made
compulsory.
Id.
On the other hand, the claimed experience of the compulsory insurance states has
not been good. See, e.g., S. HASHMI, CoMPULSoRY AUTOMOBME LABHMrY INSURANCE
(1968). 1
KRS § 304.39-090 (Supp. 1976).
,' The 1976 session of the legislature added the requirement of BRB coverage to
KRS § 304.39-110(1)(d) in order to make it consistent with KRS § 304.39-080(5).
Except for entities described in subsections (3) and (4), every owner of
a motor vehicle registered in this Commonwealth or operated in this Com-
monwealth by him or with his permission, shall continuously provide with
respect to the motor vehicle while it is either present or registered in this
Commonwealth, and any other person may provide with respect to any
motor vehicle, by a contract of insurance or by qualifying as a self-insurer,
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assure compliance with these requirements all reparation obli-
gors are required to issue to each basic reparation insured or
insured person who has rejected his tort limitations a certifi-
cate or other evidence that his policy meets the minimum re-
quirements of KRS § 304.39-110. o2 The Commissioner of Insur-
ance, by unofficial bulletin, clarified this evidence of insurance
requirement by stating:
An identification card, certificate, or policy of automo-
bile liability insurance or any equivalent document, is
deemed under KRS § 304.39-210 [sic] to provide prima facie
evidence that insurance, required by this Act, is in effect."03
If the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle is involved in an
accident and does not have the security required by KRS §
304.39-110, he is treated as a reparations obligor."°4 That is,
when the injured person collects BRB from either another re-
parations obligor or the assigned claims plan, the payor of the
benefits is subrogated to the rights of the injured person against
the uninsured owner or registrant.1 This section, however,
does not relieve the insurer secondarily liable for the payment
of his obligation to pay."'
Kentucky's no-fault legislation repealed KRS § § 187.330-
.390 which contained the security provisions of the Kentucky
financial responsibility laws. 07 Security is now required under
KRS § 304.39-110. Before its repeal, section 187.330(3) allowed
the posting of a $10,000 bond after the accident. This type of
security is no longer available; a person must either purchase
an insurance policy with the minimum liability limits and BRB
coverage or be approved by the Commissioner of Insurance as
a self-insurer. This must be done before the accident."'5
security for the payment of basic reparation benefits in accordance with this
subtitle and security for payment of tort liabilities, arising from maintenance
or use of the motor vehicle.
KRS § 304.39-080(5) (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 304.39-310(1) (Supp. 1976).
20 Bulletin 9, at 3.
201 KRS § 304.39-310(2) (Supp. 1976).
SId.
2M Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Williams, 309 So. 2d 617 (Fla. App. 1975); Farley
v. Gateway Ins. Co., 302 So. 2d 177, (Fla. App. 1974); Butler v. Gateway Ins. Co., 295
So. 2d 651 (Fla. App. 1974).
w Ky. Aers ch. 385, § 35 (1974).
2u The new law, however, maintains the prior reporting requirement. Every opera-
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Since the pre-no-fault financial responsibility'law25 was
totally repealed, Kentucky has no provision which allows sus-
pension of a vehicle license or registration in the event the
person is without the required security. The only available
remedy is a fine of not less than $50.00 and not more than
$500.00.20 Furthermore, the statute does not call for the auto-
matic reporting of these violations to the appropriate prosecu-
torial agency for the initiation of the criminal action.
Although it may be said that requiring proof of insurance
as a condition precedent to registration goes too far,21' the lack
of teeth in Kentucky's financial security requirements does not
go far enough. In fact, it is more lenient than the law prior to
no-fault, which required suspension of license and registration
if security was not maintained. 21 2 Under UMVARA § 8 a person
failing to maintain the required security must at least surren-
der his registration certificate and license plates. 3 It also re-
quires the insurer to give notice to the registrar of motor vehi-
cles when insurance is terminated. Kentucky's law is at best
inconsistent. A person can be sentenced to 6 months in jail in
addition to a fine of up to $500 for driving after having his
license and registration revoked for not correctly reporting an
accident, 24 but faces only a $500 fine for driving without the
required security.
F. Motorcycles
Motorcycles, which have been involved in a great deal of
litigation in other states, are treated separately because they
tor (or owner if the operator is physically incapable of doing so) must submit an
accident report to the Department of Transportation within 10 days of any Kentucky
accident in which a person was killed or injured or property damage totaled at least
$200. KRS § 187.320(1) (1972). If the operator fails to report the accident or fails to
give the required information correctly, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. KRS §
187.320(2) (1972). Furthermore, if the injury or property damage occurred to another
in the accident, the department could suspend or revoke the motor vehicle license or
registration of the person in violation. If the violator is a nonresident, the department
can revoke his operating privilege. Id.
2" Ky. AcTS ch. 118, § 5 (1946).
210 KRS § 304.99-050 (Supp. 1976).
211 S. HASHMI, supra note 199.
212 Ky. AcTs ch. 164, § 1 (1962) (repealed 1975).
21 UMVARA at § 8.
214 KRS § 187.990 (1972).
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are the subject of a 1976 amendment 25 to the No-Fault Act.
This amendment added KRS § 304.39-040(3), which explicitly
excludes BRB from the operators and passengers of motorcy-
cles unless coverage for the motorcycle or the individual injured
has been purchased. KRS § 304.39-060(2)(c) was also amended
to provide that tort liability was not limited for the injury to a
motorcycle passenger. In addition, KRS § 304.39-100(2) was
amended to eliminate the requirement that an insurer must
provide BRB coverage in a liability insurance contract issued
on a motorcycle, and KRS § 304.39-110(3) was added to elimi-
nate the requirement of BRB coverage as minimum security on
a motorcycle.
These specific statutory changes were implemented to ex-
clude motorcycles, their operators, and passengers from the
scope of the No-Fault Act. To that end, the General Assembly
accomplished its intention. This has not been the case in other
jurisdictions, as is evidenced by the amount of litigation in this
area. New York offers a good example. The state legislature
attempted to remove motorcycle coverage by defining "motor
vehicle" to exclude motorcycles;"' however, in at least four
New York Supreme Court cases2 7 the legislature's purpose was
frustrated. 218 These cases generally involved the collision of a
215 Ky. AcrS ch. 75 (1976).
211 N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(6) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
"Motor vehicle" shall have the meaning ascribed in section three
hundred eleven of the vehicle and traffic law, except that. . . (b) it shall
not include a motorcycle ....
N.Y. INs. LAW § 671(10) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
"Covered person" means any pedestrian injured through the use or oper-
ation of, or any owner, operator, or occupant of a motor vehicle which has
in effect the financial security required by article six or eight of the vehicle
and traffic law or which is referred to in subdivision two of section three
hundred twenty-one of such law, or any other person entitled to first party
benefits.
N.Y. INs. LAw. § 672(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973). This section mandates that the
defendant, as an owner of a motor vehicle registered in this state, have in effect liability
insurance coverage or its equivalent on his automobile. This coverage must guarantee
the payment of first party benefits to those sustaining loss arising out of the use or
operation in the state of such automobile unless such person is at the time an occupant
of another motor vehicle.
2M7 The New York Supreme Court is equivalent to Kentucky's Circuit Courts.
211 Brown v. Crawford, 377 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Perkins v. Merchants
Mut. Ins. Co. 368 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Jones v. Giordano, 366 N.Y.S.2d 534
(Sup. Ct. 1975); Glosson Motor Lines, Inc. v. Platt, 363 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
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motorcycle and an automobile, with the motorcycle operator or
passenger subsequently filing a claim with the automobile's
insurer for BRB. The courts found coverag;. Because a motor-
cycle is not considered a motor vehicle for purposes of "no-
fault," a motorcycle operator injured in an accident with an
automobile could not be considered an "occupant of another
vehicle" within the purview of the no-fault statutory provision
that a motor vehicle owner's policy shall provide for payment
of first party benefits to persons "other than occupants of an-
other motor vehicle. 219
Only the Monroe County Supreme Court in Cucinella v.
Cooper20 gave the motorcycle issue the interpretation believed
to be intended by the legislature. There the court stated, "I
interpret the phrase 'persons, other than occupants of another
motor vehicle' to mean any pedestrians.
2 1
Not unlike Kentucky, the New York legislature exempted
motorcycles from the scope of its no-fault act because of their
belief that the frequency of personal injury claims resulting
from motorcycle accidents would make the cost of no-fault in-
surance for motorcycles prohibitive.22 If this belief is justified,
it seems inconsistent that the courts of New York have shifted
the cost of BRB coverage for motorcycles to automobile insur-
ers.
Although Kentucky, through good draftmanship, has
avoided the problem faced by New York, BRB coverage is still
available to operators and passengers of motorcycles. The stat-
ute provides no BRB coverage "unless such reparation benefits
have been purchased as optional coverage for the motorcycle or
by the individual so injured. ,213 The last part of this quote can
be interpreted to mean that a motorcycle passenger or operator
who is a basic reparations insured on an automobile insurance
policy will be entitled to BRB coverage. This interpretation is
supported by Harlan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
2 2
1
219 See, e.g., Glosson Motor Lines, Inc. v. Platt, 363 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
= 371 N.Y.S.2d 620 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
221 Id. at 621.
2n Comment, 37 ALBANY L. Rv. 664, 675 at n.71 (1973).
KRS § 304.39-040(3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
353 A.2d 151, 152 (N.J. 1976). The Superior Court of New Jersey interpreted
N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 which provides that every automobile liability policy should provide
benefits, without regard to negligence, liability or fault, to the named insured and
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Regardless of the wisdom in excluding motorcycles from
the full scope of the No-Fault Act, this distinction is within the
power of the General Assembly. The Kansas Supreme Court
addressed this question in its decision that the Kansas No-
Fault Act, with a similar motorcycle exemption, was constitu-
tional."'
There is substantial reason for the Legislature to make a
distinction in the No-Fault Act between automobile owners
and operators and motorcycle owners and operators because
(1) the general physical characteristics of the two types of
vehicles considered in relation to the effects produced upon
the operators or passengers of such vehicles by an accident;
(2) a motorcycle operator involved in an accident will most
surely be thrown from the vehicle onto the pavement, and
since the weight of the vehicle is so much less than the weight
of an automobile, a collision, even at reduced speeds, will
obviously produce more serious personal injury to the motor-
cycle operator than the same collision would produce to the
driver or passengers in an automobile; (3) while the automo-
bile is used ordinarily as a family conveyance and is used
primarily on the streets and highways, most motorcyclists use
their motorcycles in addition to transportation, for pleasure
and sports on and off the public ways, [sic] and (4) because
of the difference in use, and primarily because of the vulnera-
bility of the operator or passenger on the motorcycle to seri-
ous injury, the financial exposure for medical and hospital
expenses, as well as loss of earnings, is much greater than it
would be for an automobile driver under the same circum-
stances. Hence, the cost of procuring the personal injury pro-
tection benefits would be substantially greater for a motor-
cyclist than it would be for an automobile owner."'
As the court in Manzanares pointed out, the United
States Supreme Court has supplied sufficient precedent for
this type of classification."'
members of his family residing in his household who sustain bodily injury as a result
of an accident involving an automobile; a motorcyclist who collided with an automo-
bile was entitled to recover even though the policy in question purported to limit
benefits to those relatives who were injured while occupying, using, entering into or
alighting from a private automobile.
" Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.2d 1291 (Kan. 1974).
I Id. at 1310-11 (citation omitted).
227 Id. at 1311.
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G. Statute of Limitations
If no BRB payments have been made for personal injury,
the injured party has 2 years to commence an action for their
recovery. This period begins to run when the loss is suffered
and the injured party knows or should have known that the
injury was caused by the accident; in no event, however, can
the action be commenced more than 4 years after the date of
the accident. 2 8 On the other hand, if BRB payments have al-
ready been made to the injured person, an action for additional
benefits may be commenced not later than 2 years after the last
BRB payment was received.
29
An action for survivor's benefits may not be commenced
later than 1 year after death, or 4 years after the accident,
whichever comes first; this is true, however, only if neither the
In the area of economic and social legislation, a statutory plan does not
violate the equal protection clause merely because the classifications con-
tained therein are imperfect. (Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, - U.S.
-, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L. Ed.2d 797, 42 L.W. 4475; Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 92 S.Ct. 1724, 32 L. Ed. 2d 285.) Nor does the equal protections
[sic] clause require a state to "chose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all. . . ." (Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491, 503.)
The foregoing principles were stated by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703:
"... This Court has frequently held that the legislative authority, act-
ing within its proper field, is not bound to extend its regulations to all cases
which it might possibly reach. The Legislature 'is free to recognize degrees
of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be clearest.' If 'the law presumably hits the evil where it
is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to
which it might have been applied.' There is no 'doctrinaire requirement' that
the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms. (Citations)..
(300 U.S. at 400, 57 S.Ct. at 585-86, 81 L.Ed. at 703).
In Williamson v. Lee Optical, supra, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
"... The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admit-
ting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different
dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legisla-
ture may think. (Citation). Or the reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. (Citations). The legislature may select one phase of one
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." (348 U.S. at 489, 75
S.Ct. at 465, 99 L.Ed. at 573). (emphasis supplied.)
Id.
" KRS § 304.39-230(1) (Supp. 1976).
2U Id.
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decedent nor the survivor has received BRB.23 When the dece-
dent or the survivor has received BRB payments, an action for
additional benefits may be commenced no later than 2 years
after the last BRB payment.2' If the decedent received BRB
payments prior to his death, however, an action for survivor's
benefits may be commenced not later than the earlier of 1 year
after the death or 4 years after the last payment of BRB. 2
In addition, a special statute of limitations applieswhere
a claimant has brought timely action against a reparations
obligor but has been denied benefits because another repara-
tions obligor was responsible for payment. When the action is
dismissed, the claimant has the later of 60 days or the last date
on which the action could have been commenced to initiate an
action against the correct reparations obligor or the assigned
claims plan.
KRS § 304.39-230(4) further extends the time for bringing
action against the assigned claims plan in certain situations.
A claimant denied benefits by the reparations obligor assigned
to him under the assigned claims plan has an additional 60
days after receipt of written notice of the rejection to com-
mence an action under the assigned claims plan. This provision
does not apply if the above subsections provide for a longer
period.
The statute of limitations as it relates to minors and other
legally disabled persons does not start the period running anew
when the disability is removed, such as reaching the age of
majority, even though the individual is under a legal disability
at the time the cause of action accrues."4 This right was present
before enactment of no-fault. Currently KRS § 304.39-230(5)
- KRS § 340.39-230(2) (Supp. 1976).
211 Id. Pursuant to KRS §§ 304.39-050(1) and 304.39-210 (Supp. 1976) payments
are made as expenses are incurred. If a demand is made on the reparation obligor,
payment is to be made monthly unless the accumulated expense is less than $100.
232 Id.
- KRS § 304.39-230(3) (Supp. 1976).
23 KRS § 304.39-230(5) (Supp. 1976).
- KRS § 413.170(1) (1972):
If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to
413.160, except for a penalty or forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of action
accrued, an infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought within
the same number of years after the removal of the disability or death of the
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states that the period of disability is included in the time pro-
vided for commencement of the action. The Court in Fann held
this saving provision valid as a matter of legislative choice.2ss
These time limitations, however, affect only the actions
brought under the- No-Fault Act. While these limits appear
quite liberal, they are consistent with the basic theme of the
Act. They do not force a claimant into litigation without allow-
ing sufficient time for maximum utilization of the Act's recov-
ery provisions. The legislature, however, saw fit to add an addi-
tional statute of limitation which was unnecessary to no-fault's
implementation. KRS § 304.39-230(6) provides that:
An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS 304.39-060
may be commenced not later than two (2) years after the
injury, or the death, or the last basic or added reparation
payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later
occurs.
Had this provision not been included, those not subject to the
tort right limitations, either by classification or explicit rejec-
tion, would be subject to the 1 year statute of limitation as
provided by KRS § 413.140(1). The courts must now determine
whether KRS § 304.39-230(6) completely abrogates the 1 year
statute of limitation for all personal injuries or applies only to
automobile accidents which would be subject to no-fault were
it not for KRS § 304.39 -060 .217
H. Payment of Claims by an Insurer
BRB insurers and the assigned claims plan are obligated,
Without regard to any immunity, =ss to pay BRB231 for personal
person, whichever happens first, allowed to a person without the disability
to bring the action after the right accrued.
21 Farm v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Ky. 1975).
2 The Court in Fann v. McGuffey, 534 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Ky. 1975), held that
KRS § 304.39-060 "remains subject to KRS § 413.170(1), which extends the limitation
period for infants and persons of unsound mind."
211 This phrase is directed primarily toward governmental and charitable immuni-
ties. The intent (at least with the UMVARA) was that no immunity from liability or
suit shall affect the obligations to pay BRB. See, e.g., UMVARA at § 3, Comment.
21 KRS § 304.39-210(3) (Supp. 1976) provides that:
A claim for basic or added reparation benefits shall be paid without
deduction for the benefits which are to be subtracted pursuant to the provi-
sions on calculation of net loss if these benefits have not been paid to the
claimant before the reparation benefits are overdue or the claim is paid. The
[Vol. 65
KENTUCKY No-FAULT
injuries arising out of motor vehicle accidents. 40 The insurer
providing security on the vehicle which was occupied by the
injured party or which struck the injured person has a duty to
respond with payment to the injured party within 30 days of
receiving reasonable proof of the fact and amount of loss.24 '
This duty of prompt response is based on the requirement that
BRB is to be paid monthly as the loss accrues. Losses accrue
not when the injury occurs, but as work loss, replacement serv-
ices, or medical expenses are incurred.22 The insurer, however,
can accumulate the injured party's claims for up to 31 days
after receiving notice of the loss, provided payment is made
within 15 days after the period of accumulation. 3
An insurer can also reject a claim for benefits, but if this
is done, he is required to give written notice of the rejection
along with his reasons.244 This notice must also inform the
claimant that he may file a claim with the assigned claims
bureau; this latter information, however, is not required if the
claim is rejected because the person is not entitled to the bene-
fits. 245
Insurers are encouraged to make periodic payments for
accrued loss as promptly as possible. Overdue payments bear
reparation obligor is entitled to reimbursement from the person obligated to
make the payments or from the claimant who actually receives the pay-
ments.
See also, UMVARA at § 23(c), Comment, which provides:
Subsection (c) is intended as a partial solution to the problem which
may exist if the claimant's right to payment from a collateral source which
is to be subtracted in calculating net loss (Section 11) or subtracted under a
contingent exclusion (Section 14 (b)(2)), is itself a matter of dispute or is
delayed in payment. For example, if there were substantial dispute whether
a person's automobile accident injury or death occurred in the course of his
employment, a claimant clearly entitled to benefits from some source might
be faced with conflicting claims of a workmen's compensation insurer that
the accident did not occur in the course of employment and by a basic
reparation obligor that it did. There is an explicit provision that the repara-
tion obligor is entitled to reimbursement from the collateral source or the
claimant.
248 KRS § 304.39-040(2) (Supp. 1976).
244 KRS § 304.39-210(1) (Supp. 1976). This provision also states that, if reasonable
proof is supplied as to only part of the claim and that part is at least $100, the payment
for that part is overdue if not paid within 30 days.
242 Id.
24U Id.
24 KRS § 304.39-210(5) (Supp. 1976).
245 Id.
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interest at the rate of 12 percent, but for delays without reason-
able grounds, the rate of interest is 18 percent per annum.?6
Furthermore, the insurer must pay the attorney fees the claim-
ant incurred to collect the overdue benefits.
2
1
7
If an insurer pays benefits which it later discovers were not
properly payable, it may sue to recover the payments. 248 Before
recovery, however, the insurer must show that he relied on
misrepresentation of a material fact and that this was inten-
tionally made by the insured or a person providing the items
of medical or other expense.
249
I. Subrogation and Settlement
The basic subrogation provision is KRS § 304.39-070(2)
which provides that:
A reparation obligor which has paid or may become obli-
gated to pay basic reparation benefits shall be subrogated to
the extent of its obligation to all of the rights of the person
suffering the injury against any person or organization other
than a secured person.
The primary impact of this subsection is that a reparation
obligor may not bring an action against a secured person2so Any
245 KRS § 304.39-210(2) (Supp. 1976). This provision is slightly different from
UMVARA § 23(6) which provides an 18 percent interest rate for any overdue payment
without regard to the insurer's reasons. The 18 percent figure was recommended be-
cause it was believed an insured would likely be required to pay 18 percent on most
consumer credit transactions. They also believed the rate sufficiently high to encourage
prompt payment.
27 KRS § 304.39-220(2) (Supp. 1976):
In any action brought against the insured by the reparation obligor, the
court may award the insured's attorney a reasonable attorney's fee for de-
fending the action.
This is consistent with KRS § 304.39-070(2) which provides that:
A reparation obligor which has paid or may become obligated to pay
basic reparation benefits shall be subrogated to the extent of its obligations
to all of the rights of the person suffering the injury against any person or
organization other than a secured person.
249 KRS § 304.39-210(4) (Supp. 1976).
29 Id. See also UMVARA at § 23(d), Comment:
If the supplier of the products or services for which allowable expense
benefits have been paid has inflated his bill, but the insured has not been a
party to the fraud, recovery is permitted only against the supplier.
z KRS § 304.070(1) (Supp. 1976) defines "secured person" as:
the owner, operator or occupant of a secured motor vehicle, and any
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subrogation effort must be directed at another reparation obli-
gor or an uninsured motorist who by definition becomes a re-
paration obligor.2'
KRS § 304.39-070(3) sets out two alternatives by which the
reparation obligor may assert its right of subrogation. It may
either join in a suit brought by the injured party to whom it
paid BRB, or present its claim against another reparation obli-
gor through the Kentucky Insurance Arbitration Association as
provided for in KRS § 304.39-300. The reparation obligor's
ability to join in an action against another secured person is not
inconsistent with the mandate that it may not directly sue a
secured person. The secured person exemption prevents repar-
ation obligors from possible overreaching and predatory suits
against those who have complied with the Act; however, once
an injured party has initiated a suit in tort against a secured
person this purpose is no longer furthered by forbidding the
reparation obligor's joinder.
The injured party, however, will naturally not want the
reparation obligor to join in his suit against the defendant. Just
as defendants have successfully objected to the interjection of
insurance into the trial, the plaintiff will argue that joinder will
prejudice the amount of his recovery. The Delaware Supreme
Court addressed this problem by reasoning that because of the
widespread adoption of no-fault's mandatory insurance re-
quirements, the jury would not be prejudiced. 2 Furthermore,
other person or organization legally responsible for the acts or omissions of
such owner, operator or occupant.
21 KRS § 304.39-310(2) (Supp. 1976):
An owner or registrant of a motor vehicle with respect to which security
is required under KRS 304.39-110, who fails to have such security when the
motor vehicle is involved in an accident shall have all the rights and obliga-
tions of a reparation obligor, and any other reparation obligor which has paid
or may become obligated to pay basic or added reparation benefits to an
injured person under a basic or added reparation contract or under the terms
of the assigned claims plan shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured
person against such owner or registrant.
212 DeVincentis v. Maryland Cas. Co., 325 A.2d 610, 612-13 (Del. 1974).
It is true that prior to adoption of compulsory motor vehicle insurance law,
Courts have endeavored to prevent the fact of insurance coverage from com-
ing to the knowledge of juries. However, with the advent of no-fault insur-
ance, every motor vehicle owner in this State has become apprised of the
requirement that public liability insurance coverage be carried as a prere-
quisite to motor vehicle licensing. In view of this requirement, it is unrealistic
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it held that the enactment of no-fault added nothing to the
ordinary joinder rules, which typically allow joinder if there are
identical bases of recovery and an identity of parties.s
Similar reasoning is applicable in Kentucky. Because KRS
§ 304.39-06(2)(a) prohibits liability suits instituted by an in-
jured party for damages compensated for by BRB, a plaintiff
would not be able to keep the fact of no-fault coverage from the
jury even without joinder. Because most suits will be for pain
and suffering without any claim for medical expenses, lost
wages, or other economic damages, the jury will know that
these payments were received through no-fault.
The second alternative available to the reparation obligor
allows him to present his claim against another reparation obli-
gor through the Kentucky Insurance Arbitration Association.?4
As it is with the assigned claims plan, however, the Commis-
sioner has not promulgated the rules for this association in the
Kentucky Administrative Register even though a plan of opera-
tion was submitted to the Commissioner of Insurance by the
Association and approved on August 1, 1976.5
Other sections of the Act also cover subrogation and settle-
ment. Under KRS § 304.39-050(1), when the insurer of the
vehicle containing the injured person or the vehicle striking a
pedestrian fails to make payment within 30 days, the injured
party may recover through any contract of BRB insurance
under which he is a basic reparation insured. The insurer mak-
ing such payments is then entitled to full reimbursement from
the reparations obligor providing security for the vehicle.
to assume that any jury would be unaware of the statutory requirement, or
that the jury would not proceed in the belief that the parties carried at least
the required amount of insurance. In recognition of this, it has been common
practice in this Court in cases arising since the effective date of the no-fault
insurance law to inform the jury during the course of the trial of the fact that
certain items which might otherwise be claimed for damages are covered
under the no-fault insurance law. Hence, I find no reasonable justification
for isolating a cause of action relating to recovery under the insurance policy
from the cause of action involving the injuries themselves on the ground that
the result would be to disclose insurance coverage to the jury.
Id.
" Webster v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 348 A.2d 329, 331-33 (Del. 1975).
-4 KRS § 304.39-070(3) (Supp. 1976).
2 ' A copy of the plan of operation may be obtained by writing the Department of
Insurance, Commonwealth of Kentucky, Frankfort, Ky.
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KRS § 304.39-060(7) applies when a basic reparation in-
sured recovers BRB for injuries caused by an operator who has
rejected his tort limitations. This BRB provider is subrogated
to the injured person's rights against the operator. This creates
no hardship for the legally insured operator-in 1976 the Gen-
eral Assembly required the minimum security on motor vehi-
cles to include BRB coverage. '56
In addition, KRS § 304.39-140(2) is applicable to injuries
involving added reparation benefits. To the extent a repara-
tions obligor has provided additional benefits, it is subrogated
to the injured person's right to recovery from any responsible
third party.
57
Reparation obligors who provide payment to an injured
person through the assigned claims plan are also entitled to
subrogation in two instances. The reparation obligor to whom
an injured party's claim is assigned when the claimant seeks
payment through the assigned claims plan because the repara-
tion obligor who should pay is financially unable to do so is
subrogated to the rights of the claimant against the insolvent
obligor.28 In addition, the reparations obligor, assigned a claim
which qualifies for the assigned claims plan because it was
rejected for reasons other than "that the person is not entitled
to the basic reparation benefits claim, 259 is subrogated to the
claimant's rights against the responsible obligor.
Insurers can also get subrogation when they make pay-
ments under an underinsured (as distinguished from unin-
sured) motorist provision; all insurers must make this coverage
available. When a motorist with this coverage recovers a judg-
ment which exceeds the insurance coverage on the other per-
son's vehicle, the company providing the underinsured cover-
age pays the difference. This insurer is then subrogated to the
rights of his insured against the other party.
2 60
While the Act covers many areas of subrogation, questions
remain. It is not clear from the Act, for example, to what extent
2'5 KRS § 304.39-110(1)(d) (Supp. 1976).
251 The subrogation rights of reparation obligors are subject to the alternatives
provided by KRS § 304.39-070(3). See supra text accompanying notes 252 to 255.
= KRS § 304.39-160(2) (Supp. 1976).
I' d.
2,0 KRS § 304.39-320 (Supp. 1976).
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a reparation obligor who has made no-fault payments may be
reimbursed out of the insured's recovery from the third party
responsible for the insured's injuries, nor is it clear whether the
insurer is entitled to full reimbursement for benefits paid or
only a pro rata share of the total recovery. The Act provides
that the insurer is "subrogated to the extent of its obligation
to all of the rights of the person suffering the injury, against any
person .. . ."I" While the Department of Insurance has at-
tempted to clarify this provision,"'2 the interpretation appears
confined to situations where the reparation obligor proceeds by
arbitration.
Subrogation rights under basic benefits coverage shall be
pro rata to the rights of the injured party for his residual
claim. Subrogation rights under added benefits coverage
shall be secondary to the rights of the injured party for his
residual claim. 63
It is unclear, however, whether this interpretation applies
to an action brought by the insured against a tortfeasor. Sup-
pose the insured asks for $2,000 economic damages (BRB cov-
ered expenses) and $8,000 noneconomic damages (pain, suffer-
ing, and mental anguish) and receives a judgment for $5,000.
Would the insurer be entitled to $2,000, the full extent of his
BRB payment less the applicable portion of court costs and
attorney expenses, or would the insurer be entitled to only
$1,000, the pro rata share of the entire claim? What would be
the result had the insured sued for $100,000 noneconomic dam-
ages and only received $5,000?214
26 KRS § 304.39-070(2) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
212 Bulletin 7, at 3.
263 Id.
26 The position of the Department of Insurance is that such subrogation
rights stand on an equal basis with the claim of an injured person and to the
extent that his total plan is unsatisfied, the subrogated insurer must bear
that loss in the same ratio as the injured person. For example, a judgment
or an agreement by the parties that the total damages were $50,000, and if
the defendant were judgment proof but had uninsured motorist coverage of
$10,000,the subrogated insurers would be entitled to 20% or 1/5 of the recov-
ery; In this case, $2,000. Therefore, the injured would have a subrogated
claim against $2,000 of the $10,000 uninsured motorist coverage whether it
was provided by the PIP insurer or by another insurer.
Letter from Edward L. Fossett, General Counsel, Department of Insurance to Mr.
Timothy L. Nichols, March 11, 1976.
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In Kentucky, this problem may be more apparent than
real. "The reparation obligor shall elect to assert its claim (i)
by joining as a party in an action that may be commenced by
the person suffering the injury, or (ii) [through arbitration]
... ,,"65 This should limit the recovery of the reparation obli-
gor to cases where he actually joins the injured person's suit if
he elects that alternative. Once the reparation obligor is a party
to the action, the court through its instructions should separate
each party's claim and the subsequent jury verdict should
leave little doubt as to the extent of recovery for each. This
alone seems to be a compelling reason for not allowing the
severance of the actions.26
J. Conflict of Laws
Application of the Kentucky No-Fault Act necessitates the
examination of two conflicts of law principles. The courts will
be forced to decide what law Kentucky is allowed to apply
pursuant to the United States Constitution and out of this
body of constitutionally permissible laws what law Kentucky
should in fact apply.
The due process and full faith and credit clauses of the
United States Constitution require that a state have sufficient
contact with an incident or the involved parties before applying
its own law. 8' Kentucky's No-Fault Act, however, does not
take full advantage of its constitutional ability to impose the
Act's provisions on nonresident motorists who have accidents
in Kentucky.
Although KRS § 304.39-100(2), requiring BRB coverage
and minimum security for tort liability from all insurers au-
thorized to transact or transacting business in Kentucky, is
similar to UMVARA § 9(c), the General Assembly omitted
UMVARA § 9(b) which provides:
Notwithstanding any contrary provision in it, every contract
of liability insurance for injury, wherever issued, covering
20 KRS § 304.39-070(3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
u' Contra, Webster v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 348 A.2d 329 (Del. 1975).
For a treatment of Florida's problems in this area, see Annot., 69 A.L.R.3D 826 (1976).
2 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also Hoopeston Canning Co.
v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
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ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, except a
contract which provides coverage only for liability in excess
of required minimum tort liability coverages (Section 10),
includes basic reparation benefit coverages and minimum
security for tort liabilities required by this Act, while it is in
this State, and qualifies as security covering the vehicle.
UMVARA § 9(c) was designed to serve only as a safety valve
in the event section 9(b) was held unconstitutional," 8 and it is
doubtful that this will occur.8 9 It has never been doubted,
under either the vested rights or interest analysis approach,
that an accident occurring within a state boundary gives that
state sufficient contacts to constitutionally apply its own law.
By omitting section 9(b) from the Kentucky act, many out-of-
state residents injured in accidents involving out-of-state in-
surers not transacting business in Kentucky will be unable to
collect BRB coverage from their insurers, although they will be
able to collect from the assigned claims plan. The General
Assembly, therefore, has perpetrated a situation which is
grossly unjust to motor vehicle owners and the insurance com-
panies transacting business in Kentucky who, because of the
assigned claims plan, are forced to foot the bill. The General
Assembly allows recovery for every person injured in a Ken-
tucky accident,70 but has limited the insurance companies who
must make up the difference. This may account for and justify
the fact that the assigned claims plan as well as the Bureau
itself has purposely kept a low profile. The out-of-state insurer
creates a problem as real as it is apparent." '
2,8 UMVARA at § 9(b), Comment.
29 Given the ready ability of the owner of a motor vehicle to drive his
vehicle from state to state within a few days over an interstate highway
system, it is unreasonable for an insurer to argue that it could not contem-
plate out-of-state use of the motor vehicle, or that it could only contemplate
or foresee use within a limited geographic area. Accordingly, operation of the
insured vehicle within the State, standing alone, should be a sufficient con-
tact allowing the State to impose its substantive laws upon the out-of-State
insurer of an out-of-State vehicle.
Id.
This interpretation is supported by Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that Florida had sufficient contact with a
transaction to constitutionally nullify a limitation clause in the out-of-state insurance
policy in favor of Florida law; this did not violate due process or full faith and credit.
-0 KRS § 304.39-030(1) (Supp. 1976).
21 Interview with Tom Nixon, Chief Enforcement Officer, Kentucky Department
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Kentucky could adopt the more liberal provisions of
UMVARA § 9(b), and still meet the requirements of full faith
and credit and due process. It would then be free to choose its
own conflict of law rules. 2 Kentucky's existing conflicts rule
may be as burdensome as not adopting section 9(b), however.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has departed from the tradi-
tional vested rights approach23 of lex loci delicti, that is, the
law of the place of the accident controls the rights of the par-
ties, and in lieu of this approach seems to have adopted the
interest analysis.2 4 This is evidenced in Arnett v. Thompson.2
5
[T]he court has decided that the conflicts question should
not be determined on the basis of a weighing of interests, but
simply on the basis of whether Kentucky has enough contacts
to justify applying Kentucky law.?'
This would compel Kentucky to apply its own law in all
true conflict situations. 27 17 Regardless of the wisdom of this ap-
of Insurance, in Frankfort, Kentucky, Sept. 14, 1976.
17 See, e.g., Cyr v. Farias, 327 N.E.2d 890 (Mass. 1975).
2173 E.g., Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (1968). See also Leathers,
Dimensions of the Constitutional Obligation to Provide a Forum, 62 Ky. L.J. 2, n.30
(1973):
Vested rights is that choice of law system espoused by Professor Beale,
who was the reporter for the Restatement (First) of Conflicts. At the heart
of the system is the concept of legislative jurisdiction. The basic idea is that
at the moment a thing occurs, the rights surrounding it are vested and
cannot thereafter be altered. Therefore, in an auto accident in State X, the
rights of all the parties are vested under the law of X. Since the accident
occurred within the physical boundaries of X, no other state law can deter-
mine the rights and liabilities of the parties. It is then the duty of whatever
forum called upon to hear a suit involving the accident to apply the law of
X to the case. It is said that this system is capable of uniformity and cer-
tainty due to this concept of attachment of rights and widespread enforcea-
bility thereafter. However, the system is subject to manipulation since the
forum is required only to enforce the substantive rules of the state where the
rights vested and may apply its own procedural rules. Furthermore, the
forum is not required to enforce foreign rules which are contrary to its own
public policy. Since the point of vesting will vary according to the type of
case involved, the forum can manipulate the result by its characterization
of the case, for example, denominating it as a contract case (or, for that
matter, putting it into any one of numerous legal pigeon holes) rather than
a tort problem.
2 See generally B. Cum, S ELcr EssAYs ON THE CONFLicrs OF LAw (1963), for
the establishment of interest analysis.
5 433 S.W.2d 109 (1968).
21 Id. at 113 (emphasis in original).
21 A true conflict is a situation where two states' conflicting laws will be furthered
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proach, it is better than that taken by the No-Fault Act, which
requires that Kentucky impose its law upon a nonresident mo-
torist even in false conflict situations which under the interest
analysis approach would not mandate choice of the forum's
law. 8 There is only one commentator, P. John Kozyris, who
has taken the conflict of law question seriously as it relates to
no-fault insurance acts. 9 Other commentators, like Irvin E.
Schermer, have approached the problem by dismissing it, say-
ing:
The controversy involves only the insurer and the insured
under a contract written pursuant to specific statutory direc-
tives. It is difficult to visualize the court of any foreign state
selecting as controlling the law of a state other than that to
which the contract is required to be obedient2'
Undoubtedly Mr. Schermer has not analyzed the conflicts of
law implications of the Kentucky No-Fault Act.
Professor Kozyris, on the other hand, presents what seems
to be a better alternative. He argues that the conflicts question
should be resolved in favor of the injured person's domicil. His
reasoning seems persuasive. A state's jurisdictional power to
control a person's conduct is unquestionable, but no-fault does
by their application to the incident.
The basic idea is that before one can make a choice of law, it is necessary
to analyze the policies which underlie the rules in question. In the case of
two competing rules, it is often possible to see that the policy behind one rule
will not be furthered by its application to the facts at hand. Obviously, in
this simple situation, the rule whose policies will be furthered is the correct
one to apply. The situation is a bit more difficult when both rules have
relevant policies but one clearly outweighs the other, and of course, is most
difficult when both rules have strong policies and application of either rule
will do violence to the policies of the other.
Leathers, supra note 273, n.31 at 7. Currie, however, argues that in a true conflict
situation, a forum should apply its own law. His position is based on the idea that only
the legislature, not the courts, may defer the legitimate interests of one state to the
law of another state. See generally CURUE, supra note 274.
2 Even Currie believes that in a false conflict situation where the policy behind
the state's law will not be furthered by the application of that law it should not be
applied even though it is the law of the forum state. See generally CURIE, supra note
274.
279 See Kozyris, No-Fault Insurance and the Conflict of Laws-An Interim
Update, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1009; Kozyris, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Con-
flict of Laws-Cutting the Gordian Knot Home-Style, 1972 DuKE L.J. 331.
M SCHERMER, supra note 19, § 7.01 at 7-1.
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not involve conduct. Instead it provides remedies for injuries,
and the only state which has a substantial interest in seeing
that the injured person is compensated is the state of domicil,
not the state in which the accident occurred. What legitimate
purpose would Kentucky have in imposing its $10,000 BRB
coverage limitation on an injured person who is domiciled in
Michigan, when Michigan places no limit on recovery and
would probably be the state to pay the injured person's welfare
benefits if his disability is not compensated?
III. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the purposes set forth in KRS § 304.39-
101, the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act was de-
signed to be a significant advancement in social legislation. It
is understandable, therefore, that various commentators and
special interest groups sought to doom the Act in its primary
stages and later to challenge its constitutionality in the courts.
In spite of these attempts, the Kentucky plan withstood consti-
tutional attack, and is now approaching its second year of im-
plementation without the major problems or setbacks fore-
casted by its opponents; the Kentucky Act provides a realistic
approach to the substitution of basic reparation benefits for the
traditional remedy in tort.
Though it is relatively well understood that the Act does
not cover property damage nor change the traditional tort rem-
edy for property damages, many people do not realize the sig-
nificance and scope of this legislation. As a general proposition
the Kentucky Act provides BRB payments to everyone injured
in automobile accidents occurring in Kentucky. The few excep-
tions to this proposition include converters, those intentionally
causing injury, and uninsured owners injured in their own au-
tomobile. While these exceptions are very limited when com-
pared with other no-fault acts, they nevertheless, are consistent
with the recovery orientation of the Kentucky Act.
The tort limitation or threshold provisions of the Act are
also misunderstood. This is not a total bar to all liability suits;
actions are prohibited only when injuries are less severe or
below the threshold amount and then only when they seek
damages for such things as pain and suffering, mental anguish,
inconvenience and those medical expenses under the threshold
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which were paid by the reparation obligor. In contrast to these
favorable comments, however, the Kentucky Act is not without
faults. Although future case law and other interpretations of
the Act will solve many of the problems, there are still areas
which should be reconsidered by the General Assembly.
Even though compulsory insurance may not be the best
answer because of its loopholes and high cost of administration,
Kentucky's present enforcement of the insurance requirement
appears to go too far to the other extreme. The Act would be
better enforced with stiffer fines or revocation of the unin-
sured's registration and license. Broad BRB coverage coupled
with the lack of strict enforcement provides no incentive for the
present uninsured motorist to purchase the required coverage.
Another problem is the reference to the Kentucky wrongful
death statute. This is inconsistent with Kentucky's loss to sur-
vivor approach in the payment of survivor's economic and serv-
ice benefits. Kentucky should adopt a separate survivors stat-
ute to be used exclusively for payment of no-fault benefits.
Such a statute could more accurately reflect the purposes of the
Act.
Furthermore, information concerning the Assigned Claims
Plan is not readily available. Few attorneys know where to refer
clients who would not receive BRB outside of the plan. More
importantly, many of the injured who are within the scope of
the Act's protection but cannot afford legal counsel are without
relief because they do not know about this method of recovery.
The Department of Insurance should obviously publish their
interpretation and guidelines in the Administrative Register.
This, however, will provide the necessary information only to
attorneys and not to all those who need it. If the Act's recovery
orientation is to be implemented, a much broader method of
information dissemination must be used.
While it may be desirable to extend basic reparation bene-
fits to all nonresident motorists injured in Kentucky, one must
realize that those insurance companies not registered or doing
business in Kentucky are not paying their proportional share
of the costs. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that
Kentucky's limits are better than the limits for which the in-
jured motorist contracted in his home state. If Kentucky is to
provide BRB on such a broad scale, the General Assembly
should extend its requirement of security for BRB payments to
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its full constitutional limit and include all contracts of liability
insurance, wherever issued, covering an operator or owner in-
volved in an accident in Kentucky and not just those issued by
companies doing business in the state.
Even with these problems, however, it is clear that the no-
fault idea is here to stay. Its importance can only increase as
more states adopt one of its variations.
Robert P.Moore
David W. Rutledge
